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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
The moment has finally arrived for American constitutional thought to engage 
with the laws and legal practices of other nations. Prompted largely by the 
Supreme Court’s reference to foreign constitutional practices in a number of high-
profile cases,1 this encounter may become central to the reshaping of American 
constitutional discourse in the early stages of the twenty-first century.2 References 
                                                 
* Visiting Assistant Professor, Boston College Law School (2006–2007) and S.J.D. 
Candidate, Harvard Law School. I am grateful to Frank Michelman, Fred Schauer, and 
Katie Young for comments on previous drafts. I am equally grateful for the institutional 
support of the Edmond J. Safra Center for Ethics, Harvard University, where I was a 
graduate fellow during the 2005–2006 academic year. 
1 Among the recent cases, see Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 n.21 (2002) 
(Stevens, J.) (referring to the opinion of the world community that executing the mentally 
retarded is wrong), Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 571–73 (2003) (Kennedy, J.) 
(discussing the values of Western civilization regarding homosexual conduct), and Roper v. 
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575 (2005) (Kennedy, J.) (mentioning the “stark reality” that the 
United States is the only country in the world that gives official sanction to the juvenile 
death penalty).  
2 American constitutional law is currently going through a period of profound 
transformation. In a letter to his readers explaining his decision not to complete work on 
the third edition of his epoch-making treatise American Constitutional Law, Professor 
Laurence Tribe had this to say about the general current state of American constitutional 
law and about the impact of foreign and international law:  
 
[W]e find ourselves at a juncture where profound fault lines have become 
evident at the very foundations of the enterprise [of constitutional law] . . . .  
. . . .  
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to foreign law, especially when made in the process of constitutional interpretation, 
can trigger the type of self-examination that, regardless of outcome, is likely to 
leave a lasting imprint on American legal thought. 
This Article reflects on the discourse that has accompanied the opening up of 
American law to the reality of global constitutional phenomena. Central to this 
discourse is the debate over the authority of foreign laws and legal practices in the 
process of domestic constitutional interpretation. The debate offers illuminating 
insights into how a form of discourse can shape the American constitutional self-
understanding. That discourse, this Article contends, straightjackets the 
constitutional imagination that the encounter with foreign law has the potential to 
enrich and refine. When approached with some degree of detachment, this debate 
seems encased in a series of unconvincing, if familiar, distinctions and normative 
justifications that have cemented much of the American constitutional mindset. 
The foreign law debate provides an ideal setting for studying the subtle ways in 
which the potentialities inherent in the global constitutional framework are tamed 
and neutralized.  
The   analysis here is   confined   to a subset  of   the  broader   interaction     
between     American   law   and    what    has   been     called   transnational   law,3  
                                                                                                                            
. . . The new century, it increasingly seems, marks what look like the 
beginnings of a period of profound transformation. There is an emerging 
realization that the very working materials of American constitutional law may 
be in the process of changing. . . .  
There is . . . a sharp continuing debate addressing how the work of 
Congress fits within the corpus of constitutional law . . . . [and] about whether 
and when treaties and other forms of international law can themselves impose 
quasi-constitutional norms and limitations on [the U.S. government] . . . . 
The recent interest in comparative law is but one spark in an ongoing 
explosion of inter-disciplinary scholarly effort . . . . 
 
Laurence H. Tribe, The Treatise Power, 8 GREEN BAG 2d 291, 295, 297–98 (2005).  
3 “Transnational law” was first discussed in Phillip C. Jessup, The Concept of 
Transnational Law: An Introduction, 3 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1 (1963), and later 
developed in HENRY STEINER & DETLEV VAGTS, TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS 
(1968). See Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law, 106 YALE L.J. 
2599, 2626 (1997) [hereinafter Koh, Why Do Nations Obey] (noting that the transnational 
law approach was characterized by “its focus on the transnational, normative, and 
constitutive character of global legal process”). “Transnational law” is also used as a loose 
category that encompasses, on the one hand, both international and foreign law and, on the 
other hand, domestic law. See Harold Hongju Koh, The Globalization of Freedom, 26 
YALE J. INT’L L. 305, 306 (2001) [hereinafter Koh, Globalization of Freedom] (“[W]e must 
start treating transnational law as its own category. Domestic and international processes 
and events will soon become so integrated that we will no longer know whether to 
characterize certain concepts as local or global in nature.”). For the use of the term 
“transnational law” in constitutional law, see Mark Tushnet, Transnational/Domestic 
Constitutional Law, 37 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 239, 239 (2003).  
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or world law,4 or global law.5 What characterizes this latter body of law, however 
one chooses to label it, is that it encompasses both international law, in its 
customary as well as treaty-based forms, and foreign law, which in this 
understanding includes the internal arrangements of the world’s legal systems. The 
focus here is the interaction between American law and foreign law at the 
constitutional level, and how this interaction has been conceptualized in 
constitutional discourse.6 More specifically, this Article is concerned with the 
expansion of the canon of authoritative materials to include foreign constitutional 
practices for purposes of domestic constitutional interpretation.7 However, nothing 
in my argument implies that the use of foreign law is or should be limited to the 
constitutional realm,8 nor that its impact should be analyzed exclusively by 
reference to decisions of federal courts and in particular the U.S. Supreme Court.9 
While there are good independent reasons why constitutional law is a relevant 
setting for analyzing the authority of foreign law in the American legal system, my 
analysis tracks closely the structure of the foreign law debate as it has crystallized 
in contemporary constitutional discourse.  
One caveat should be noted regarding the relation between foreign and 
international law. There are cases, such as the ban on the death penalty for 
juveniles or the mentally handicapped, when the solutions of the world’s legal 
systems converge and, accordingly, the domains of foreign law and customary 
international law overlap.10 The very fact of their convergence might be the effect 
                                                 
4 See Harold J. Berman, World Law, 18 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1617, 1622 (1995) 
(defining “world law” as the body of law that “combine[d] inter-state law with the common 
law of humanity, on the one hand, and the customary law of various world communities, on 
the other”). 
5 See generally ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER (2004) (see 
especially Chapter Two, Judges: Constructing a Global Legal System).  
6 Throughout this Article, the use of “comparative constitutionalism” refers to this 
interaction.  
7 “Foreign constitutional practices” means the decisions of foreign courts as well as 
more general practices such as modes of reasoning, models of institutional interaction, etc. 
Unless specified otherwise, this term throughout the Article is synonymous with “foreign 
law.”  
8 See Jeremy Waldron, Foreign Law and the Modern Ius Gentium, 119 HARV. L. REV. 
129, 129 (2005) (disapproving of the fact that many scholars explain the citation of foreign 
law only in constitutional cases). For a discussion of the use of foreign legal materials 
outside constitutional law, see Shirley S. Abrahamson & Michael J. Fischer, All the 
World’s a Courtroom: Judging in the New Millennium, 26 HOFSTRA L. REV. 273, 280–83 
(1997) (discussing the doctrine of informed consent in different legal systems).  
9 See generally Margaret H. Marshall, “Wise Parents Do Not Hesitate to Learn from 
Their Children”: Interpreting State Constitutions in an Age of Global Jurisprudence, 79 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1633, 1641 (2004) (arguing that state judges are in a particularly good 
position to take advantage of the potential of comparative constitutional law). 
10 See infra Parts II and III. 
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of a norm of international law on domestic legal systems.11 Yet the distinction 
between foreign law and international law is useful to keep in mind, as is the 
difficulty in separating them at times, given the claim that challenges to their 
authority from a domestic perspective rest on different grounds. International law 
is said to suffer from a democratic deficit,12 whereas the difficulties with foreign 
law sources are mainly methodological and concern the need for accuracy in cross-
constitutional comparisons.13 This  Article challenges the soundness of such clear-
cut distinctions by showing that, contrary to the common wisdom in contemporary 
constitutional discourse, the democratic objection and methodological worries 
mutually reinforce each other.  
My analysis of the encounter between American law and foreign 
constitutional practices is both descriptive and normative. At a descriptive level, 
the Article shows how the constitutional debate in its current form fails to do 
justice to the transformative potential intrinsic to that encounter. . Despite a flurry 
of contemporary scholarship in this area, the central questions are being evaded. A 
survey of the foreign law debate shows the limitations of the different theoretical 
models proposed in the literature. For instance, both advocates and opponents of 
the use of foreign law in constitutional interpretation point to the lack of a 
methodology for judges looking at foreign law sources. Such a methodology 
would help answer questions about which jurisdictions judges should consult, how 
to check sources and references, how they can escape the dangers of nominalism, 
and how to assess the relevance of a particular provision or line of reasoning 
outside of its broader legal, cultural, and historical context. Because even 
advocates of the use of foreign law would be hard-pressed to propose workable 
methodologies, they limit their defense of the use of foreign law to a small number 
of cases, such as the death penalty, where an emerging consensus among the 
world’s legal systems makes it easier to evade the above challenges.  
At a normative level, this Article exposes a misunderstanding about the 
relation between method and substance in contemporary constitutional discourse. It 
                                                 
11 The prohibition on capital punishment for crimes committed by juveniles is 
mentioned in a number of international documents. See United Nations Convention on the 
Rights of the Child art. 37, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Sept. 2, 
1990); see also International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 6(5), opened for 
signature Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976); African 
Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child art. 5(3), OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/24.9/49 
(1990) (entered into force Nov. 29, 1999).  
12 See generally John O. McGinnis, Foreign to Our Constitution, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 
303, 313–14 (2006). Of course, the democratic deficit is only one argument against the use 
of international law. A more comprehensive list can be found in Patrick M. McFadden, 
Provincialism in United States Courts, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 4, 37–38 (1995) (arguing that 
international law is “blocked, sidestepped, or ignored at almost every turn” by American 
courts because it is unknown, not raised, unusual, foreign, undemocratic, not law, not 
applicable, trumped by domestic law, not persuasive, or not appropriate). 
13 See Sarah H. Cleveland, Our International Constitution, 31 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 101 
(2006). 
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argues that methodological misgivings of the type that have been at the center of 
the argument against the use of foreign law are the by-product of disconnecting 
method from substance. In fact, it is only by articulating a theoretical vision and, 
through it, the normative grounds for the use of foreign law, that answers could be 
found to largely legitimate methodological worries.14 These answers have far-
reaching implications for our understanding of the nature of a constitutional 
system, the commitments of American constitutional democracy, and the role of 
constitutional adjudication.15  
The Article begins by drawing the contours of the foreign law debate, 
followed by an analysis of the distinction around which the debate in its current 
form has crystallized. The distinction is between situations where there is an 
emerging world consensus from those in which no such consensus is in sight.16 In 
the first case, which is taken up in Part III, authority can rest on either the reasons 
behind a given consensus or it can be content-independent, for instance when it is 
based solely on the fact of the existence of a consensus. The Article discusses both 
situations by reference to the Court’s juvenile death penalty decision in Roper v. 
Simmons.17 It then turns to the debate over the domestic status of customary 
international law norms, whose family resemblance with the foreign law debate 
has thus far been by and large ignored. This will set the stage for understanding the 
subtlety and shortcomings of the approach that portrays foreign law as the modern 
ius gentium (law of nations). In Part IV, the Article takes up substantive and 
methodological challenges to the use of foreign law mostly by reference to 
“piecemeal comparisons.” Part IV discusses the argument from self-government, 
the argument from normative constitutional coherence, and the argument from the 
                                                 
14 The lack of a theory is often lamented in the literature. See Joan L. Larsen, 
Importing Constitutional Norms from a “Wider Civilization”: Lawrence and the Rehnquist 
Court’s Use of Foreign and International Law in Domestic Constitutional Interpretation, 
65 OHIO ST. L.J. 1283, 1327 (2004) (“This ‘everyone’s doing it’ approach to constitutional 
interpretation requires explanation and justification. Yet, to date, neither the Court nor the 
academy has offered a justification that satisfies. Until they do, it seems we are better off to 
abandon this particular use of foreign and international law.”); see also Diane Marie 
Amann, “Raise the Flag and Let It Talk”: On the Use of External Norms in Constitutional 
Decision Making, 2 INT’L J. CONST. L. 597, 604 (2004) (“[C]onsultation [of external 
norms] remains selective, unbounded by any coherent criteria.”); Cleveland, supra note 13, 
at 88 (qualifying the use of international law as sloppy and opportunistic). 
15 Contemporary legal scholarship has usually proceeded in the reverse direction by 
subjecting international and foreign law to the authority of traditional models of 
constitutional theory. See Roger P. Alford, Misusing International Sources to Interpret the 
Constitution, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 57, 59 (2004) (applying Alexander Bickel’s constitutional 
theory to argue that the authority of foreign law for purposes of constitutional interpretation 
poses an “international countermajoritarian difficulty”); Anupam Chander, Globalization 
and Distrust, 114 YALE L.J. 1193, 1196 (2005) (discussing the phenomenon of 
globalization through the prism of John Hart Ely’s constitutional theory). 
16 Throughout this Article, the “world consensus” means “emerging world 
consensus.”  
17 543 U.S. 551 (2005).  
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integrity of American constitutional discourse. The method of this Article is to 
engage with some of the main theories that have given the foreign law debate its 
current structure. While my analysis does not purport to offer a definitive answer 
the question of the authority of foreign law, its conclusions about the limitations of 
the dominant form of discourse are meant to change the terms of the debate.  
 
II.  THE FOREIGN LAW DEBATE 
 
This Part II provides a few clarifications about the scope, nature, and structure 
of the foreign law debate. In a sense, it is far from obvious why the influence of 
foreign practices on American law should become the subject of debate. Legal 
systems do not develop identities in a vacuum. Although with time they might 
acquire greater control over their environments, or learn how to adapt to them, they 
can never fence themselves off completely from their influence. The American 
constitutional system is no exception. The Declaration of Independence urges 
“decent respect to the opinions of mankind”;18 the Federalist Papers counseled 
attention “to the judgment of other nations”;19 the constitutional text refers to 
foreign nations and mentions the existence of the law of nations;20 the early cases 
of the Marshall Court discussed at length the law of nations;21 it was international 
law that provided the point of reference for the Supreme Court’s elaboration of the 
powers inherent in national sovereignty in the aftermath of the Civil War;22 the 
American civil liberties movement had its “roots in a pre-World War I 
international law cosmopolitanism”;23 and the Cold War, some scholars have 
argued, explains in large part the success of the Civil Rights Movement,24 when 
doctrines such as free speech, equal protection, privacy, and Fourth Amendment 
                                                 
18 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776). Justice Ginsburg has 
taken this as the starting point of her defense of the use of foreign law in constitutional 
interpretation. See Ruth Bader Ginsburg, “A Decent Respect to the Opinions of 
[Human]kind”: The Value of a Comparative Perspective in Constitutional Adjudication, 
Keynote Address at the Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law 
(April 1, 2005) available at http://www.asil.org/events/AM05/ginsburg050401.html. But 
see Eugene Kontorovich, Disrespecting the “Opinions of Mankind,” 8 GREEN BAG 2d 261 
(2005).  
19 THE FEDERALIST NO. 63 (Alexander Hamilton or James Madison). 
20 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.  
21 See, e.g., Nereide, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 388, 423 (1815); Murray v. Schooner 
Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804). Both cases are discussed in Harold 
Hongju Koh, International Law as Part of Our Law, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 43, 44–45 (2004). 
22 Gerald L. Neuman, The Uses of International Law in Constitutional Interpretation, 
98 AM. J. INT’L L. 82, 82–83 (2004). 
23 See John Fabian Witt, Crystal Eastman and the Internationalist Beginnings of 
American Civil Liberties, 54 DUKE L.J. 705, 705 (2004).  
24 JOHN SKRENTNY, THE MINORITY RIGHTS REVOLUTION (Harvard Univ. Press 2004) 
(2002); see also Mary L. Dudziak, Desegregation as a Cold War Imperative, 41 STAN. L. 
REV. 61, 66 (1988). 
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jurisprudence were meant to distance American law from the totalitarianisms that 
plagued last century.25  
While the modern foreign law debate is informed to some extent by this long 
history, its point is more normative and forward-looking. What is being debated is 
the expansion of the canon of methods of constitutional interpretation to include 
foreign constitutional practices alongside text, structure, history, values, pragmatic 
consequences, and others. Thus defined, the foreign law debate is not coextensive 
with the broader field of comparative constitutionalism—for instance; matters of 
constitutional design are not covered—although the Article uses them 
interchangeably.  
Three elements bear emphasis at this stage: first, the agents of the expansion 
are judges, not scholars or legislators;26 second, the debate refers specifically to 
constitutional interpretation, although the use of foreign law is not limited to the 
constitutional realm;27 and third, the expansion is self-conscious in that its agents 
are aware of its methodological, structural, and substantive implications for the 
entire corpus of constitutional law. At one level, these implications are evaluated 
from the perspective of core constitutional principles such as separation of powers, 
democratic self-government, or judicial review. At another level, implications are 
assessed by their impact on American constitutional discourse, more specifically 
on how the ascription of normative force to foreign law may alter the integrity of 
that discourse.28  
The evolution of the foreign law debate has so far been marked by two 
distinct stages. The challenge at the first stage was to demonstrate a family 
resemblance between American constitutional law and foreign constitutional 
developments, with the implication that the latter could help American lawyers 
gain a more refined understanding of their own system.29 This pursuit of self-
                                                 
25 See Richard Primus, A Brooding Omnipresence: Totalitarianism in Postwar 
Constitutional Thought, 106 YALE L.J. 423, 423 (1996) (“[T]he desire to articulate 
principles that distinguished America from the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany 
contributed to a long line of liberal Supreme Court decisions from the Second World War 
through the Warren era.”). Professor Primus’s article also shows how awareness of 
totalitarianism’s “brooding omnipresence” offers a key of interpretation for the main 
developments in constitutional theory during the same period. Id. at 456−57. 
26 For a discussion of the relevant differences, see Charles Fried, Scholars and 
Judges: Reason and Power, 23 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 807, 808−13 (2000). 
27 See generally Waldron, supra note 8, at 143−47. 
28 See, e.g., Ernest Young, The Trouble with Global Constitutionalism, 38 TEX. INT’L 
L.J. 527, 545 (2003) (“The problem is that I fear domestic constitutional law may soon 
cease to exist as an autonomous discipline. Who makes the law? . . . What rights do I have? 
Well, a few under the domestic constitution—but also others under international human 
rights treaties and the like. It is just increasingly unrealistic to study constitutional structure 
without including supranational institutions and constitutional rights without including the 
corpus of international law.”). 
29 Included in this category Bruce Ackerman, The Rise of World Constitutionalism, 83 
VA. L. REV. 771 (1997), Sujit Choudhry, Globalization in Search of Justification: Toward 
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knowledge, which is standard in comparative legal studies, collided with an 
ingrained sense of the uniqueness of the American constitutional experience.30 
Hence the seemingly modest claims and almost apologetic tone that characterized 
the first wave of scholarship.31 Foreign practices admittedly had no normative 
teeth, but they could still shed an “empirical light”32 on issues such as the 
recognition of a right to die,33 or unveil a false pretense of necessity in arguments 
about constitutional structure in issues such as federalism,34 or simply help to 
understand the peculiarities of American constitutional doctrine in areas like free 
speech.35 Interest in foreign law would have receded quickly if it had not been 
picked up by legal practice. For both sociological36 and normative37 reasons, 
reference to foreign materials began to increase considerably in judicial opinions. 
This practice brought about an uproar from other constitutional actors—judges, 
legislators, and scholars—who opposed it as undemocratic. American law and 
constitutional cultures were brusquely awakened to the reality of a larger 
constitutional world.  
The second moment in the debate grew out of this initial reaction.38 While at 
this stage claims about the normativity of foreign constitutional practices have 
                                                                                                                            
a Theory of Comparative Constitutional Interpretation, 74 IND. L.J. 819 (1999), and Mark 
Tushnet, The Possibilities of Comparative Constitutionalism, 108 YALE L.J. 1225 (1999). 
30 For an example of using foreign law to reflect on U.S. constitutional doctrine, see 
Frank I. Michelman, Reflection, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1737 (2004).  
31 See Tushnet, supra note 29, at 1228 (“My claim is . . . rather modest: U.S. courts 
can sometimes gain insights into the appropriate interpretation of the U.S. Constitution by a 
cautious and careful analysis of constitutional experience elsewhere.”); see also Choudhry, 
supra note 29, at 824 (“My goal, though, is somewhat narrower: to describe and explain the 
interpretive methodologies used, and the normative justifications offered, by courts for 
their use of comparative jurisprudence in constitutional interpretation.”).  
32 This phrase was coined by Justice Breyer. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 
898, 977 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
33 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 734 (1997) (Rehnquist, C.J.) (discussing 
the experience with the legalization of physician-assisted suicide in the Netherlands).  
34 See Vicki C. Jackson, Constitutional Comparisons: Convergence, Resistance, 
Engagement, 119 HARV. L. REV. 109, 126 (2005).  
35 See Frederick Schauer, The Exceptional First Amendment, in AMERICAN 
EXCEPTIONALISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS 29, 29–56 (Michael Ignatieff ed., 2005). 
36 See Jeoffrey Toobin, Swing Shift: How Anthony Kennedy’s Passion for Foreign 
Law Could Change the Supreme Court, NEW YORKER, Sept. 12, 2005, at 42, 44. See 
generally Frederick Schauer, The Politics and Incentives of Legal Transplantation, in 
GOVERNANCE IN A GLOBALIZED WORLD 253, 254 (Joseph S. Nye Jr. & John D. Donahue 
eds., 2000) (discussing legitimacy-seeking strategies to explain the migration of 
constitutional ideas); SLAUGHTER, supra note 5, at 96–99.  
37 See Roger P. Alford, In Search of a Theory for Comparative Constitutionalism, 52 
UCLA L. REV. 639, 659–73 (2005) (discussing natural law as a theoretical model for 
comparative constitutionalism).  
38 Among the scholarship representative of this second moment are Jeremy Waldron, 
supra note 8, at 139−32, Ernest A. Young, Foreign Law and the Denominator Problem, 
119 HARV. L. REV. 148, 149–51 (2005), and Jackson, supra note 34, at 122–23.  
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grown more robust, partly due to the Court’s reference to foreign law in cases such 
as Atkins v. Virginia39 and Roper v. Simmons,40 they have also shrunk. The defense 
of the use of foreign law is now confined to situations where there is an emerging 
international consensus on the issue under consideration, as was the case in Roper 
with the ban on juvenile death penalty41 or in Atkins with the ban on the execution 
of mentally handicapped offenders.42 As we shall see later, the defense of the use 
of foreign law that turns on the existence of an emerging legal consensus depends 
on the questionable assumption that narrowing the claim for the authority of 
foreign law also deepens it. Contrary to the expectations of its advocates, the depth 
effect cannot occur because this strategy begs the questions about methodology 
(Which jurisdictions to cite? How to escape the dangers of nominalism? How to 
check the accuracy and relevance to foreign cases?) posed by those skeptical of the 
use of foreign law. These worries are paramount in mature constitutional systems 
that tend to guard closely their methodological gates.  
The polarization of the current structure of the foreign law debate has 
radicalized its participants even more. The debate centers around two poles. At one 
pole are the “internationalists” who regard the use of foreign law as an inevitable 
outcome of legal globalization. They draw attention to the line that separates 
domestic from international law, which is shifting due to developments in both 
legal realms.43 At the domestic level, the advent of rights-based constitutionalism 
has opened constitutional law to influences originating outside its traditional 
domain.44 At the international level, the evolution after the Second World War of 
international law has started to encompass relations between states and their 
citizens, which traditionally were part of the domestic constitutional realm.45 Since 
                                                 
39 536 U.S. 304, 317 (2002).  
40 543 U.S. 551, 575–78 (2005).  
41 See id. 
42 See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 317. 
43 See Vicki C. Jackson, Transnational Discourse, Relational Authority, and the U.S. 
Court: Gender Equality, 37 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 271, 271–72, 286, 309 (2003) (“This new 
normativity of human rights law is reflected in the way references to other constitutional 
courts’ decisions are often accompanied by references to international legal norms as well. 
The sense of distinctive sovereignties is diminished, as is the strong distinction between 
domestic constitutional law and international legal norms . . . .” (footnote omitted)).  
44 The phrase “rights-based constitutionalism” comes from Neuman, supra note 22, at 
84.  
45 This constituted a departure from a Benthamite vision of international law. See 
generally M.W. Janis, Jeremy Bentham and the Fashioning of “International Law,” 78 
AM. J. INT’L L. 405 (1984), for a description of Bentham’s contribution to international 
law. However, it is true that international law may have never been purely Benthamite, at 
least in this respect. See Beth Stephens, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain: “The Door Is Still Ajar” 
for Human Rights Litigation in U.S. Courts, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 533, 544–45 (2005) 
(“International law in the late-eighteenth century included the law governing relations 
among states and the ‘more pedestrian’ law governing individuals when they acted across 
state lines, as in the law merchant. But the Court found that international law also included 
a ‘narrow set’ of ‘hybrid international norms’ in which the ‘rules binding individuals for 
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foreign law is part of this broader legal convergence, the “internationalist” camp 
argues that attempts to resist are doomed to fail.46  
This position fails to explain why the bastion of constitutional interpretation 
ought not to be protected from the influence of foreign law. The question is not one 
of inevitability, since there seems to be widespread agreement that, in one form or 
another, the use of foreign law will only increase over the coming years.47 
However, awareness of inevitability is hardly a source of comfort. To the extent 
this expansion of the canon of authoritative materials is deemed illegitimate, its 
critics—the “traditionalists”—argue that it should be resisted. Law is a domain of 
principled decision making48 and an argument is necessary as to what makes the 
use of foreign law for interpretative purposes “principled.” In the end, both the 
internationalist and traditionalist positions fail to make explicit and defend the 
normative premises that inform them. They cannot hope to succeed without 
making the justification of those premises internal to their arguments.    
 
III.  WORLD LEGAL CONSENSUS 
 
Until the Court’s recent decision in Roper, the United States was the only 
country in the world that officially sanctioned the juvenile death penalty in the 
twenty-first century.49 The Supreme Court affirmed the constitutionality of this 
practice as late as 1989.50 In Stanford v. Kentucky, the Court decided, in a five-to-
four split, that the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of “cruel and unusual 
punishment” did not invalidate state laws that made capital punishment available 
for murders committed by children between sixteen and eighteen years old at the 
time of their crime.51 Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia concluded that the 
Court could “discern neither a historical nor a modern societal consensus 
forbidding the imposition of capital punishment [for juvenile offenders].”52 During 
                                                                                                                            
the benefit of other individuals overlapped with the norms of state relationships.’” (quoting 
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 715 (2004))). 
46 See, e.g., Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Brave New Judicial World, in AMERICAN 
EXCEPTIONALISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 35, at 277, 297 (comparing attempts to 
resist the use of foreign law to attempts to block the Internet).  
47 See Slaughter, supra note 46, at 302 (“In a decade, perhaps two, judicial references 
to the decisions of their foreign counterparts will be no more surprisingly than the 
introduction of foreign elements into American cuisine.”). 
48 See Michelman, supra note 30, at 1759 (describing law’s telos as a domain of 
principled social decision-making). 
49 See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575 (2005). 
50 See id. at 574. 
51 492 U.S. 361, 380 (1989); see also Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 838 
(1988) (holding unconstitutional capital punishment for offenders under sixteen years old 
at the time when they committed the crime). 
52 Stanford, 492 U.S. at 380.  
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the ten years prior to the Stanford decision, only four countries—Rwanda, 
Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Barbados—had executed minors.53 
By 2004, the United States had become the only country in the world that 
continued to have the juvenile death penalty in the books.54 At the national level, 
five states had abandoned it in the intervening years since Stanford, bringing the 
total number of states that prohibited it, either by carving out specific exceptions or 
as part of a general ban on the death penalty, to thirty.55 In Roper, the Court 
overruled its own precedent and decided that juvenile death penalty is 
unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment.56 Although evidence of recent state 
legislative enactments was “less dramatic” than in other Eighth Amendment cases 
with a similar history in the Court,57 the majority nevertheless deemed this 
evidence “significant” and pointed out that evidence of a national consensus is less 
in numbers than in “the consistency of the direction of change.”58 Another leg of 
the Court’s argument was that social science findings regarding differences 
between juveniles and adults (lack of maturity, underdeveloped sense of 
responsibility, and susceptibility to outside pressure and influence) do not warrant 
the inclusion of juveniles in the category of the worst offenders to whom the death 
penalty should ostensibly be confined.59 That conclusion, combined with the 
exceptional nature of the penalty and the argument that its social purposes—
retribution and deterrence—failed to provide adequate justification in the case of 
juvenile offenders, led the Court to impose a categorical ban.60  
After presenting each of these arguments, the Court referred to “the stark 
reality” that the United States remained the only country in the world to allow the 
death penalty for juveniles.61 Proceeding with cautiousness, the Court took pains to 
emphasize that foreign constitutional practices are instructive, not determinative, 
of its own interpretation of the Eighth Amendment.62 It is not entirely clear from 
the Court’s opinion whether reference to the world consensus was meant as a self-
standing argument or simply as an additional ground that added weight to 
                                                 
53 See id. at 389; see also Roper, 543 U.S. at 577 (stating that Iran, Pakistan, Saudi 
Arabia, Yemen, Nigeria, The Democratic Republic of Congo, and China have executed 
minors since 1990). 
54 Roper, 543 U.S. at 575. 
55 Id. at 564.  
56 Id. at 574–75. 
57 Id. at 565. This is to be compared with the rate of abolition of the death penalty for 
the mentally handicapped. Between 1989 and 2002, sixteen states had moved in that 
direction. This trend weighed heavily in the Court’s consideration of the constitutionality 
of state laws that still allowed it. See Atkins v. Virginia 536 U.S. 304, 314–15 (2002). 
58 Roper, 543 U.S. at 566 (quoting Atkins, 536 U.S. at 315).  
59 Id. at 569–71. 
60 Id. at 571–72. In her dissenting opinion, Justice O’Connor argued for a cases-by-
case approach in assessing the constitutionality of capital punishment for juveniles. See id. 
at 605 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
61 Id. at 575. 
62 See id. at 578. 
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conclusions the Court had reached independently. On the one hand, in asserting 
whether a form of punishment is cruel and unusual, the Court’s own methodology 
urges consideration of the “evolving standards of decency that mark the progress 
of a maturing society.”63 Ever since its first statement almost half a century ago, 
this standard has been taken to include the views of other “civilized nations.”64 For 
example, in Thompson v. Oklahoma the Court reflected on its method of 
interpreting the Eighth Amendment, observing that it had previously “recognized 
the relevance of the views of the international community in determining whether a 
punishment is cruel and unusual.”65 On the other hand, the Court mentioned that 
“the overwhelming weight of international opinion against the juvenile death 
penalty . . . does provide respected and significant confirmation” for its own 
conclusions in direct relation to its social scientific findings.66  
The question is, what exactly is being invoked in cases where the Court refers 
to the unitary practices of other nations? In his dissent in Roper, Justice Scalia 
wrote that “‘acknowledgment’ of foreign approval has no place in the legal opinion 
of this Court unless it is part of the basis for the Court’s judgment,” and then 
continued, “which is surely what it parades as today.”67 Justice Scalia happens to 
reject the Court’s method of interpreting the Eighth Amendment—hence, his 
choice of the word “parades”—but the question remains valid even without any 
subversive innuendoes. 
Professor Ernest Young’s recent analysis of the Roper Court’s use of foreign 
law is an original and forceful answer to this question.68 His starting point is 
somewhere between Justice Scalia’s and established precedent. For Professor 
Young, the question is still open whether the practice of foreign jurisdictions is 
relevant for the purpose of the Eighth Amendment.69 Theoretically, foreign law can 
offer factual or normative guidance. Roper, he argues, falls in the latter category 
because the Court’s use of foreign law was meant “to ‘confirm’ a proposition of 
value,” namely that “the death penalty is disproportionate punishment for 
offenders under 18.”70 Normative guidance can take two forms: one is content 
                                                 
63 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).  
64 See id. at 102 (referring to the international community of democracies); see, e.g., 
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 n.21 (2002) (acknowledging that the death penalty 
for crimes committed by mentally retarded offenders is overwhelmingly disapproved by 
the world community); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 796–97 & n.22 (1982) 
(discussing the abolition of the felony murder doctrine in other legal systems); Coker v. 
Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 596 n.10 (1977) (surveying how many nations retained the death 
penalty for rape).  
65 487 U.S. 815, 830 n.31 (1988). 
66 Roper, 543 U.S. at 578 (mentioning that the world consensus rests “in large part on 
the understanding that the instability and emotional imbalance of young people may often 
be a factor in the crime”). 
67 Id. at 628 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
68 Young, supra note 38, at 148. 
69 See id. at 167. 
70 Id. at 150 (citing Roper, 543 U.S. at 574). 
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dependent—when the authority of foreign constitutional practices is persuasive in 
the sense that it derives from the reasons underlying those practices—another is 
content independent (“nose-counting”)—when authority rests on numbers, that is, 
on the mere fact that foreign jurisdictions subscribe to a given view regardless of 
underlying justifications 71 Professor Young accuses the Roper Court of engaging 
in this form of “nose-counting,” and considers the decision telling of the Court’s 
general approach to foreign law.72  
Part III.A looks at Young’s critique of the content-independent authority of 
foreign law. Part III.B turns to alternative models that portray the authority of 
foreign law as a function of the substantive reasons on which the world legal 
consensus rests. Part III.C looks at the interaction between American law and the 
international legal order in the context of debates about the domestic status of 
customary international law norms. This sets the stage for a study of the approach 
in Part III.D that sees in the world legal consensus an instantiation of modern-day 
ius gentium.  
 
A.  Content-Independent Authority 
 
The authority of a legal norm is content-independent when it does not depend 
on that norm’s background justification. In the case of foreign legal norms the 
background reasons – internal to each system – that led to consensus are less 
relevant compared to the fact of the consensus itself. .Professor Young accuses the 
Roper Court of ascribing content-independent authority to the emerging global 
norm about the nature of capital punishment for juvenile offenders. In his view, the 
Court engaged in “nose-counting” foreign jurisdictions.73 Assuming that this 
descriptive account of the Court’s reasoning is correct, the method may appear 
problematic on two grounds.  
One is that it is not authorized by constitutional text or structure.74 Young 
subscribes to this view75 since, as we saw, he does not consider settled the Court’s 
method of interpretation in Eighth Amendment cases. However, the problem with 
this view is that few of the established methods of constitutional interpretation 
have support in constitutional text or structure, so this argument is fatally 
overinclusive. 
                                                 
71 See id. 
72 Id. at 152, 155 (“[The] lack of interest in the reasons underlying foreign practice is 
characteristic of the Court’s employment of foreign law . . . . The Court is not persuaded by 
new rationales, but rather by the mere fact that foreign jurisdictions take a particular view 
. . . . It is deferring to numbers, not reasons.”). 
73 See id. at 153–56. 
74 See Tushnet, supra note 29, at 1231–32 (“[T]he Constitution must license the use of 
comparative material for the courts to be authorized to learn from constitutional experience 
elsewhere.”). One such example is the Constitution of South Africa, which stipulates at 
article 39 (1,c) that “[w]hen interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or forum . . . 
may consider foreign law.” S. AFR. CONST. art. 39, cl. 1(c) (2005).  
75 See Young, supra note 38, at 163–65. 
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“Nose-counting” may also appear problematic because it lacks moral 
authority: in and by itself the fact of consensus carries no guarantee of moral 
authority. This idea requires qualification. In a sense, the point is intuitively true: 
slavery was morally wrong even when the vast majority thought the opposite. 
Similarly, one would not need to look at foreign practices to determine whether it 
is morally permissible to execute human beings for crimes they committed when 
they were children. In fact, one would not need to look at domestic practices either, 
or “look” at all. Thinking the matter through—in an armchair, if you wish—would 
do. From a strong natural law standpoint, the fact that others may or may not 
subscribe to a given moral position does not add or subtract from its moral weight. 
But  “nose-counting” would lack moral authority even if the latter rested on 
weaker grounds. Presumably consideration of “evolving standards of decency” in 
Eight Amendment jurisprudence entails a weak form of conventional morality. 
Even here, moral authority has to rest on an assessment of the reasons behind the 
consensus of states, and not simply on the fact of its existence.76 That fact itself 
could be the result of international arm-twisting, legitimacy-seeking, or simply a 
tendency to fall into patterns by imitating the behavior of other states 
(“acculturation”).77 
The charge that nose-counting lacks moral authority is strong, but it can only 
make an impression if one believes in a connection between law and morality. It 
may well be that nose-counting lacks such authority, but if all other legal matters 
do also, then this charge is rather off-point. Professor Young seems to subscribe to 
such a view, albeit with a caveat: in addition to lacking legal authority, nose-
counting parades as having some moral authority for strategic, unprincipled 
reasons.78 The mere fact of a world consensus was used strategically in Roper to 
“swell the denominator,”79 that is, to enlarge the community by reference to which 
the decency of a standard was to be assessed. “[B]y shifting focus from the 
domestic to the international plane[,] . . . the Roper majority made an implausible 
claim of ‘consensus’ into a plausible one.”80  
One should not hasten to deny that the mere fact of world consensus might 
carry at least some moral authority. To acknowledge that does not commit one to a 
                                                 
76 However, there may be some circumstances where the fact of consensus itself, 
irrespective of the reasons on which it rests, is somehow deemed moral. For such a 
classification and corresponding discussion, see Larsen, supra note 14, at 1293–98. For a 
similar account that treats the fact of consensus as “persuasive,” see Cleveland, supra note 
13, at 11 (“Today, where a foreign or international law norm is not itself legally binding on 
the United States, it is the consensus of states regarding shared common values that gives 
the norm its persuasive force.”). 
77 Young, supra note 38, at 157 (citing Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, How to 
Influence States: Socialization and International Human Rights Law, 54 DUKE L.J. 621, 
638–56 (2004)). 
78 See id. at 155. 
79 Id. at 153.  
80 Id. at 149. For a discussion of the strategy of limiting/expanding the relevant 
community, see also Larsen, supra note 14, at 1322–25. 
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full-blown natural law conception whose jurisprudential credentials are rather 
suspect nowadays. Legal authority may very well need to rest on more than purely 
moral grounds, yet moral authority may sometimes be necessary to establish the 
existence of legal authority. It is widely accepted among most contemporary 
positivists that a legal system contains a “minimum content of natural law.”81 This 
is where framing the debate in terms of the relevant denominator tends to overlook 
the importance of the specific subject matter under consideration.  
The denominator problem has figured most prominently in First Amendment 
obscenity cases, and Young’s argument about foreign law rests explicitly on those 
aspects of constitutional jurisprudence.82 Since what passes as obscene is not 
determined by thinking matters through in an armchair, but rather by reference to 
“community standards,” debates in this area have centered on methods of 
determining the relevant community.83 Constitutional protection of this form of 
speech turns on how the denominator is determined, but it should be remembered 
that here as elsewhere method tracks subject matter. If we start from the idea of a 
“minimum content of natural law,” regardless of one’s views about what that 
minimum should include, there will always be subject matters that are left 
uncovered. In fact, it is quite likely that the minimum should include a rule against 
executing children but not one about nude dancing. This is why analogies in 
denominator situations break down. The denominator problem is not the same in 
Roper as in obscenity cases, and, what is more, portraying the problem of foreign 
law in Roper as one of choosing the right denominator gets the stages of legal 
analysis in the reverse order. Even if one sought to justify the use of foreign law by 
reference to subject matters included in the “minimum” content of natural law that 
arguably all legal systems share, the starting point should emphasize the subject 
matter and not the denominator problem. Now, it is doubtful that a theory that 
focuses on the idea of a minimum core of natural law does justice to the potential 
of comparative constitutionalism, but even if it were otherwise there would still be 
no reason to believe that the mere fact of world legal consensus tells us which 
subject matters should be included in that minimum core. 
 The strength of both arguments against recognizing the content-independent 
authority of foreign law in situations of world consensus is not self-evident. It is 
time now to turn to the descriptive dimension of Professor Young’s analysis. 
He is correct to point out that nose counting, rather than substantive 
engagement, characterizes the Court’s normative use of foreign law.84 However, 
Roper is not the ideal case to make this point. For one, the Court’s own precedents 
in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence include foreign jurisdictions within the 
relevant community for determining standards of decency. This makes Professor 
                                                 
81 H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 193–200 (2d ed. 1997) (1961); see also Neil 
MacCormick, Natural Law Reconsidered, 1 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 99, 99–101 (1981) 
(reviewing JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS (1980)).       
82 See Young, supra note 38, at 158–61. 
83 See id. at 159–60 (citing several illustrative cases). 
84 See id. at 151.    
182 UTAH LAW REVIEW [No. 1 
  
Young’s claim that the Court “use[s] foreign law [in Roper] to ‘confirm’ a 
proposition of value”85 somewhat misleading. In fact, the Court looks at foreign 
law as part of a broader methodology for reaching a value-laden conclusion about 
the proportionality of a form of punishment. Substantive arguments are available 
that question the appropriateness of this methodology. Perhaps considerations of 
which punishment is disproportionately cruel and unusual are matters of cultural 
contingency or historical development that do not travel well from one society to 
another. Comparative law scholars have analyzed why standards of decency vary 
among societies86 and some have argued that forms of constitutional self-
understanding prevent cross-constitutional borrowing.87 But these substantive 
arguments differ starkly from positions that begin by postulating a standpoint—
usually against the use of foreign law—whose subsequent revision is subject to 
conditions that are virtually impossible to meet.  
The descriptive and evaluative dimensions of the argument against the use of 
foreign law in cases such as Roper are inextricably linked. To understand them, 
one needs to spell out what in the constitutional discourse allows the critics to 
postulate a standpoint against foreign law and then derive their positions from it. In 
their purest form, exemplified by Justice Scalia’s originalist argument against 
foreign law in Roper,88 these positions are tautological. If the point of 
constitutional interpretation is defined to exclude any influence of foreign law, 
then the only avenue left for defending the relevance of foreign law is rejecting 
that specific theory of constitutional interpretation. Because the history on which 
originalism relies is itself subject to interpretation, originalism à la Scalia becomes 
more of a conceptual claim about the role of constitutional interpretation and of 
constitutional law more generally.89  
In its less extreme version, such as Professor Young’s, the argument against 
foreign law falls short of tautology but its conclusions remain tightly packed in its 
premises. Even if arguments from democracy, constitutional structure, and 
institutional competence—that Professor Young invokes and which are discussed 
at some length later—are meant to challenge the use of foreign law as nose-
counting, it is difficult to see how any possible conception, including one that 
advocates the use of foreign law as persuasive authority, could ever meet them. 
 To be sure, there is nothing intrinsically objectionable about holding such a 
                                                 
85 See id. at 150. 
86 See, e.g., James Q. Whitman, Enforcing Civility and Respect: Three Societies, 109 
YALE L.J. 1279, 1281–87 (2000).  
87 See, e.g., Paul W. Kahn, Comparative Constitutionalism in a New Key, 101 MICH. 
L. REV. 2677, 2678 (2003).  
88 See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 608 (2005). 
89 To prove this point, it helps to remember that there are other types of originalism. 
For instance, based on her interpretation of early American constitutional history, Justice 
Ginsburg concluded: “In the value I place on comparative dialogue—on sharing with and 
learning from others—I count myself an originalist . . . .” Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Looking 
Beyond Our Borders: The Value of a Comparative Perspective in Constitutional 
Adjudication, 22 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 329, 330 (2004). 
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view. What is problematic, however, is framing the argument in a way that does 
not acknowledge its normative assumptions and does not make their defense an 
integral part of the argument. My point at this stage is only to draw attention to the 
discursive structure that makes it possible to take the initial standpoint against 
foreign law for granted. 
 
B.  Persuasive Authority90 
 
As we saw above, Professor Young has little to say about the possibility of 
using foreign law as persuasive authority.91 But suppose the Supreme Court were 
to engage substantively with the reasoning of foreign courts.92 The model that is 
usually deployed to capture this type of interaction is that of a transnational 
judicial dialogue. Judges enter what resembles an ideal conversation with their 
foreign peers. Devoid of formal rules or any patterns of undue pressure, the only 
authority recognized in this conversation is that of the better legal argument. For 
anyone who sees law as not (entirely) a matter of will but (also) of reason, the 
prospect of such a dialogue is appealing.93  
Take the example of the death penalty for adult offenders. In the world today 
there is an emerging consensus against the death penalty. Foreign courts have 
addressed the issue of the compatibility of death penalty with the values of a 
modern democratic state in a number of occasions and have produced elaborate 
decisions, oftentimes by engaging the arguments of their American counterparts.94 
American courts face no textual hurdle in becoming part of this cross-
                                                 
90 Persuasive authority is discussed at length in Vlad Perju, Comparative 
Constitutionalism and the Making of a New World Order, 12 CONSTELLATIONS 464, 476–
79 (2005).  
91 See Patrick Glenn, Persuasive Authority, 32 MCGILL L.J. 261, 261 (1987) 
(discussing the role of persuasive authority “as a necessary means of relief from the 
instrumentalism of contemporary national law-making”). It should be noted that the 
distinction between precedential and persuasive authority is somewhat ambiguous. 
Oftentimes precedential authority in law is recognized as such because it is also persuasive. 
Common-law judges routinely have to select among different lines of precedent that are 
equally relevant to the case at hand. The doctrinal classification of the case, the level of 
generality and the precise formulation of the claim, the facts deemed relevant—all are tools 
available to judges in distinguishing precedents they do not find persuasive.  
92 See generally Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Global Community of Courts, 44 HARV. 
INT’L L.J. 191, 193 (2003) (examining the global community of courts emerging in 
transnational litigation through “constitutional cross-fertilization” and “active cooperation 
and vigorous conflict among national courts”); Anne-Marie Slaughter, Judicial 
Globalization, 40 VA. J. INT’L L. 1103, 1104 (2000) (analyzing “judicial globalization” by 
way of interaction and cooperation between national and international law). 
93 See Waldron, supra note 8, at 146–47. 
94 See, e.g., State v Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) (S. Afr.); Decision No. 
23/1990 (X. 31) Alkotmánybíróság [AB] [Constitutional Court], Oct. 24, 1990, Magyar 
Közlöny [MK.] 1990/107 (Hung.), translated in 1 E. EUR. CASE REP. CONST. L. 177 
(1994). 
184 UTAH LAW REVIEW [No. 1 
  
constitutional dialogue, as they would in joining a similar conversation about, say, 
the right to bear arms.95 Furthermore, the Court has been struggling with the 
constitutionality of capital punishment for decades and the issue remains far from 
settled.  
A survey of case law shows that the death penalty debate has two 
components. One is the crafting of procedural guarantees in cases where the death 
penalty is sought that would eliminate the possibility of judicial errors. The 
experience of foreign courts could be used to shed an “empirical light” on various 
criminal procedures. This is what we have referred to above as the factual, as 
opposed to normative, use of foreign law. The second component of the debate is 
normative and refers to the compatibility of capital punishment with values such as 
human dignity that inform the normative core of the Eighth Amendment.96 Given 
the role of dignity in the constellation of values that characterizes any modern 
constitutional democracy, foreign law could be used as persuasive authority. It 
bears emphasis that these two components, and corresponding usages of foreign 
law, are not entirely disconnected. The relevance of empirical data is likely to be 
called into question unless a certain commonality by way of normative background 
is established.  
Since their decisions lack precedential authority,97 foreign courts can 
influence the reasoning of American judges only to the extent the latter deem their 
arguments persuasive. If they do not, then American judges can reason their way 
out of an emerging world consensus. Let us now assume that the reasoning of 
foreign courts does contain arguments that have the potential to persuade their 
American counterparts.98 Yet it can be safely predicted, given how divisive the 
American legal debates on the topic of the death penalty have been and for how 
long the debate has been raging, that not all judges are likely to be persuaded by 
any one argument. What does the persuasive authority model say about this 
situation?  
At first blush, it seems this model gives judges a relatively easy way out: they 
would only need to indicate that they find the arguments of foreign courts 
unpersuasive. On closer inspection that way out might not be all that easy. The 
burden would fall on these judges to show why they remain unpersuaded, and that 
requires that they engage with the arguments of foreign courts. These practical 
consequences are somewhat obscured by an untenable, if pervasive, distinction 
between precedential and persuasive authority. In the case of precedential 
                                                 
95 See Sanford Levinson, The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 YALE L.J. 637, 
639–42 (1989). 
96 See Paulo G. Carroza, “My Friend Is a Stranger”: The Death Penalty and the 
Global Ius Commune of Human Rights, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1031, 1077–79 (2003). 
97 See Stanford Levinson, Looking Abroad when Interpreting the U.S. Constitution: 
Some Reflections, 39 TEX. INT’L L.J. 353, 353 (2004) (arguing that it would be foolish to 
claim that foreign decisions have precedential authority).  
98 See, e.g., Makwanyane, 1995 (3) SA 391. For an analysis, see Carol S. Steiker, 
Pretoria, Not Peoria—S v. Makwanyane and Another, 1955 (3) SA 391, 74 TEX. L. REV. 
1285, 1287–89 (1996). 
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authority, judges who are not persuaded—for whatever reasons—that a given 
precedent should apply engage in a process of distinguishing that precedent from 
the case under consideration. Of course the doctrine of stare decisis compels them 
to follow established precedents, but it is common for judges to dig out the facts of 
a given case in search of details that would justify departure from precedent. As far 
as persuasive authority is concerned, this model is based on the premise that the 
mere fact of shifting the burden of justification will have enough of an impact on 
the constitutional debate. As any lawyer knows, the onus probandi often 
determines the winner in a legal battle.  
It is doubtful that this is one of those cases. Shifting the burden might have 
such an impact, but that is precisely why these attempts will remain vigorously 
resisted. What fuels the debate about the burden of proof is a deeper normative 
clash between different visions of constitutionalism. A normative vision allowed 
Professor Young to argue from a standpoint against the use of foreign law without 
having to defend that initial choice; a different normative vision supports the case 
for recognizing foreign law as a persuasive authority. This clash is present in other 
areas of law, as our study of the debate between revisionist and modernist positions 
in customary international law will demonstrate.99 This instinctive skepticism 
toward foreign and international matters is rooted in a specific understanding of the 
American constitutional project.  
 
C.  Lessons from the Customary International Law Debate 
 
Custom has long been a puzzle in international law. By definition, custom 
reflects “a general and consistent practice of states followed by them from a sense 
of legal obligation.”100 The problem is that both of its constitutive elements are 
vague and insufficiently defined: It is unclear what qualifies as a general, unitary, 
and consistent state practice, just as it is difficult to determine opinio juris, or the 
motivations that drive states to act the way they do. The second explanation is that 
these difficulties have not downplayed the authority of state obligations deriving 
from customary international law in relation to treaty-based obligations. While in 
the latter case, claims to the effect that international law norms impinge on national 
sovereignty can be easily deflected by pointing out that their authority ultimately 
rests on the express decision of the domestic “sovereign,”101 the authority of 
                                                 
99 The relevance to foreign law is even more direct, given the inherently comparative 
methodology used in identifying rules of customary international law. See, e.g., Rex D. 
Glensy, Which Countries Count: Lawrence v. Texas and the Selection of Foreign 
Persuasive Authority, 45 VA. J. INT’L L. 357, 362 (2004) (observing that customary 
international law norms are “inherently comparative in nature in that it requires courts to 
canvass a variety of materials, including some sources which originate abroad”). 
100 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 
102(2) (1987).  
101 This made Professor Mark Tushnet qualify arguments cast in the language of 
sovereignty in discussions about the authority of foreign law as “misleading.” See Tushnet, 
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customary international law is implied from the fact that the domestic sovereign 
does not object to the existence of the customary rule.102 The distinction between 
implied and express authorization gains weight considering the sacrosanct role of 
sovereignty in legal thought.  
These difficulties are compounded by recent developments in customary 
human rights law. From a traditional model that developed inductively and 
included rules of war, maritime affairs, and diplomatic relations, custom has now 
become a deductive and “purposive”103 process that relies less on state practice and 
more on general statement of rules. Torture, for example, is considered a rule of 
customary international law even if it cannot be said, especially nowadays, that 
states are engaged in a unitary, general, and consistent practice of prohibiting its 
use. Some have called for bolder moves to recognize the status of customary 
international law norms to a long list of human rights, including freedom of 
expression, religious freedom, or even social rights.104  
The domestic status of international law is a matter regulated internally by 
any legal system. In American law, the canonical statement was made by the Court 
in The Paquete Habana more than a century ago: “International law is part of our 
law.”105 The exact meaning of these words, as far as the domestic status of 
customary international law is concerned, has recently become a matter of 
controversy. Two schools of thought, which have been labeled “modern” and 
“revisionist,” offer radically different historical narratives and accounts of the state 
of doctrine.  
The “modern” school argues that customary international law norms had the 
status of self-executing general common law under the regime of Swift v. Tyson,106 
when common law was determined independently by both federal and state 
courts107 and followed the regular hierarchy of rules whereby decisions of federal 
authorities trumped those of states. In Erie v. Tompkins, the Court put an end to 
                                                                                                                            
supra note 3, at 261; see also Cleveland, supra note 13, at 9 (arguing that international law 
is not foreign).  
102 This point is compounded by arguments about what qualifies as an instantiation of 
the “persistent objector” rule. For instance, a treaty reservation, as in the case of the U.S. 
reservation to article 6(5) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra 
note 11, that prohibits juvenile death penalty, may not qualify as an objection to an 
emerging international practice that could arguably be seen as a norm of customary 
international law. See Cleveland, supra note 13, at 120–21. 
103 Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, III, The Current Illegitimacy of 
International Human Rights Litigation, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 319, 326–28 (1997) 
(describing the phenomenon and attributing the phrase “purposive creation of custom” to 
LOUIS HENKIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW: POLITICS AND VALUES 33, 37 (1995)). 
104 See id. at 366−68 (and references included therein). 
105 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900). 
106 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 9 (1842).  
107 See Louis Henkin, International Law as Law in the United States, 82 MICH. L. 
REV. 1555, 1557–58 (1984). 
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this regime when it denied the existence of a federal general common law,108 thus 
setting the basis for a new federal common law restricted to areas in which “a 
federal rule of decision is ‘necessary to protect uniquely federal interests,’ and 
those in which Congress has given the courts the power to develop substantive 
law.”109 This development called into question the domestic status of customary 
international law, which could now be either part in the “new” federal common 
law or be left within the attributions of states. As the “modern” school of thought 
argues, the Court took the view in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino110 that it 
made little sense to leave the determination of the domestic status of various norms 
of customary international law within the attributions of states. First, such a regime 
threatened to jeopardize the unity of meaning of customary international law 
across the United States, and, second, states lacked international law recognition. 
The other (revisionist) school of thought111 denies the “modern” approach to 
customary international law post-Erie. It claims that because norms of customary 
international law were not self-executing federal law pre-Erie, and because Erie 
conditioned its incorporation into the new corpus of federal law on express 
authorization of a political branch, it follows, first, that, lacking such authorization, 
customary international law post-Erie is state law and, second, that it cannot form 
the basis for federal jurisdiction.112  
                                                 
108 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) (“Except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution 
or by acts of Congress, the law to be applied . . . is the law of the state.”). 
109 Tex. Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 640 (1981) (quoting 
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 426 (1964)) (other citations omitted); 
see also Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 726 (2004) (mentioning the Court’s 
precedents in rules about the interpretation of collective-bargaining agreements and 
evidentiary privileges in federal-question cases). 
110 376 U.S. at 423–27. 
111 See generally Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International 
Law as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815 
(1997); Phillip R. Trimble, A Revisionist View of Customary International Law, 33 UCLA 
L. REV. 665 (1986); A.M. Weisburd, State Courts, Federal Courts, and International 
Cases, 20 YALE J. INT’L L. 1 (1995).  
112 There are some intermediate positions that do not fit within either of the above two 
schools of thought. See Michael D. Ramsey, International Law as Part of Our Law: A 
Constitutional Perspective, 29 PEPP. L. REV. 187, 193–205 (2001) (dividing the revisionist 
argument on constitutional grounds into two parts and arguing that it is correct about 
international law not preempting inconsistent state law, but wrong about international law 
not forming the basis for federal jurisdiction); Ernest A. Young, Sorting Out the Debate 
over Customary International Law, 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 365, 467–85 (2002) (arguing that 
customary international law should be treated as “general law,” neither federal nor state 
law in nature, but which would remain available to both state and federal courts to apply 
following traditional principles of the conflict of laws); see also T. Alexander Aleinikoff, 
International Law, Sovereignty, and American Constitutionalism: Reflections on the 
Customary International Law Debate, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 91, 91 (2004) (arguing that 
customary international law is best “viewed as a tertium quid, neither federal nor state law, 
but, rather, law to be applied in appropriate cases by federal courts in instances where they 
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The division between modern and revisionist positions mirrors a distinction 
between two conceptions of American constitutionalism (democratic and 
internationalist constitutionalism) that structure much of the contemporary 
constitutional discourse and which the Article explores in the next section.113 It 
suffices for now to point out that the revisionist historical interpretations were first 
advocated less than a decade ago by scholars and judges who were becoming wary 
that the “new” customary human rights law threatened the democratic character of 
American law. Consider, as a hypothetical, the implications of recognizing the ban 
on juvenile death penalty or even the prohibition of the death penalty in general as 
a norm of customary international law.114 The main difference between the 
revisionist and modernist positions refers to whether federal courts have the power 
to authorize the incorporation of these norms into the federal common law. If they 
do not, and a political branch does not expressly authorize their incorporation, they 
are state law and enjoy whatever degree of protection the various states afford 
them. This is what the revisionist position advocates. If, by contrast, courts are 
given that power, as advocates of the “modern” position intimate that they have, 
then, once incorporated, their status would be superior to both state law and prior 
acts of Congress and inferior to the Constitution, which remains the supreme law 
of the land, and later acts of Congress.115 The revisionists reject the “modern” 
account on grounds of federalism, separation of powers, and representative 
democracy.116 Their reasons for rejection would be even stronger had they been 
presented with a claim that customary international law norms are self-executing, 
i.e., that even post-Erie they do not require express authorization into federal law. 
                                                                                                                            
otherwise possess jurisdiction” (footnote omitted)); Ryan Goodman & Derek P. Jinks, 
Filartiga’s Firm Footing: International Human Rights and Federal Common Law, 66 
FORDHAM L. REV. 463, 495–97 (1997) (arguing that the norms of customary international 
law applied in federal courts should be limited to jus cogens norms).  
113 See infra Part IV.A. 
114 Some scholars have made this suggestion. See, e.g., Lea Brilmayer, Federalism, 
State Authority, and the Preemptive Power of International Law, 1994 SUP. CT. REV. 295, 
307−08, 322−26 (1994); Joan Fitzpatrick, The Relevance of Customary International 
Norms to the Death Penalty in the United States, 25 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 165, 168−77 
(1995).  
Assume further that the United States could not invoke the persistent objector rule, 
thus neutralizing its application. For a discussion of the invocation of this rule in the 
context of the juvenile death penalty, see Curtis A. Bradley, The Juvenile Death Penalty 
and International Law, 52 DUKE L.J. 485, 516–35 (2003). 
115 See Gerald L. Neuman, Sense and Nonsense About Customary International Law: 
A Response to Professors Bradley and Goldsmith, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 371, 386–87 
(1997) (“Absent . . . dissent, customary human rights norms represent valid international 
obligations of the United States . . . . [I]f the United States has acquired human rights 
obligations that impose further limitations on the States [than those imposed by domestic 
constitutional law], then these obligations are presumptively enforceable. If Congress 
opposes the application of such norms in domestic law, it has the constitutional authority to 
deny them domestic enforcement.”).  
116 See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 111, at 861–70.  
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However, that is not the case with the rules in our hypothetical, and it would not be 
the case with any rule of customary human rights law. 
At first blush, the reasons for rejecting the modern position seem very strong. 
What amplifies them significantly is, as we saw, the purported danger of a large 
body of customary human rights law that threatens to become part of American 
law after bypassing democratic channels. It is essential for our purposes to 
understand exactly what this danger is. As the revisionists see it, the danger is that 
human rights activists might succeed in convincing federal courts to incorporate 
the body of “new” human rights rules en masse. Revisionists perceive the danger 
as real given that some courts are known as sympathetic to such claims. For 
instance, the revisionists see many of the internationalist-flavored decisions in 
American law, which are often invoked by the “modern” school of thought, as part 
of a “crusade” by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals.117  
Relevant for our purposes is that the revisionists’ portrayal of the danger is a 
wild exaggeration, and that the debate it has sparked is indicative of the dynamics 
of the broader constitutional paradigm. In addition to problems that plague the 
“new” customary human rights law within the field of international law, and about 
which the “revisionists” remain conspicuously silent,118 domestic American law 
does not—for good or worse—run the risk of being invaded with “undemocratic” 
customary rules about, say, minimum wage or the right to decent health care. This 
observation need not rely on the Court’s decision in Sosa,119 which, being decided 
in 2004, could not have answered the revisionists’ fears a decade ago. My point 
rather is that one could easily have anticipated that if the Court were ever to 
recognize a right of the federal judiciary to incorporate customary human rights 
norms, the most it could have done was exactly what it eventually did in Sosa. 
That decision does not warrant the apocalyptic predictions of the revisionist school 
of thought.  
Sosa concerned the interpretation of the Alien Torts Statute (“ATS”), which 
was adopted by the first Congress in 1789 and has been, since the decision of the 
Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala120 in 1980, the main 
legal tool for international human rights litigation in federal courts. Section 1350 
of the statute reads: “The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil 
action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a 
treaty of the United States.”121 While the issues arising under the ATS constitute 
only a subset of a broader debate about customary international law, it specifically 
addressed revisionists’ fears in that it laid down the criteria that federal courts 
                                                 
117 See Paul B. Stephan, A Becoming Modesty—U.S. Litigation in the Mirror of 
International Law, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 627, 630 (2002) (referring specifically to the 
discovery of the Alien Tort Statute in the 1980s). 
118 For an account of different theories of custom within international law, see 
generally Anthea Elizabeth Roberts, Traditional and Modern Approaches to Customary 
International Law: A Reconciliation, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 757 (2001). 
119 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004). 
120 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). 
121 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006). 
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ought to use in incorporating customary human rights norms into federal law. Even 
if section 1350 has a specific domain of application, the Sosa decision retains its 
relevance for our purposes because, first, the interpretative mechanism it laid down 
will apply throughout American law whenever customary human rights norms are 
invoked and, second, the ATS remains the main tool for international human rights 
litigation (in case the revisionists are equally concerned that the separation of 
powers prevents courts from overstepping into the domain of foreign affairs, which 
they might see as falling exclusively within the domain of the executive).  
At issue in Sosa was whether section 1350 created a cause of action to sue in 
federal courts to recover damages for violation of an alleged norm of customary 
human rights against arbitrary arrest and detention.122 In short, the Court was asked 
to decide whether section 1350 is purely jurisdictional or whether it also creates a 
cause of action. While all of the Justices agreed that the provision was 
jurisdictional, they parted ways as to whether legislative intent indicates that new 
causes of actions could be created under the statute for violation of customary 
international law, other than those that constituted a violation of the laws of nature 
at the time when the statute was adopted. The majority answered this question in 
the affirmative, deciding in essence that the most egregious perpetrators of the 
most egregious violations of international law can be held accountable in 
American courts.123 The Court held that the door for causes of action that 
effectively incorporate customary human rights norms into federal common law “is 
still ajar subject to vigilant doorkeeping, and thus open to a narrow class of 
international norms.”124 In order to qualify for protection, the norms whose 
violation is alleged have to be, first, clearly and specifically defined and, second, 
accepted among civilized nations.125 None of the Justices believed that the norm 
                                                 
122 542 U.S. at 697–99. 
123 See id. at 735−39. There is disagreement about the correct interpretation of the 
Court’s holding in Sosa, but this much is clear. See Stephens, supra note 45, at 535.  
124 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 729. 
125 Id. at 732. In addition to the criteria that the norm has to fulfill, the claim itself has 
to meet a number of requirements: it has to be filed after domestic remedies have been 
exhausted, its resolution ought not to interfere with a policy of case-specific deference to 
the political branches, etc. See id. at 733 n.21. It might be worth adding one additional 
remark about the language that the Court used in spelling out the above criteria. It is 
surprising that the nineteenth-century distinction between civilized and uncivilized nations 
should find its way into a decision of the Court in the twenty-first century. An example is 
the language of article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, which 
mentions among the sources of international law “the general principles . . . recognized by 
civilized nations.” Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(1)(c), June 26, 1945, 
59 Stat. 1031. This formulation was replaced in the Restatement Third of Foreign Relations 
Law by the “general principles common to the major legal systems.” RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 102 (1987) (emphasis added). For scholarly 
analysis, see generally GERRIT W. GONG, THE STANDARD OF ‘CIVILIZATION’ IN 
INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY (1984). Among the recent scholarship is ANTONY ANGHIE, 
IMPERIALISM, SOVEREIGNTY AND THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005).  
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against arbitrary arrest and detention (no use of torture was alleged) in that 
particular lawsuit qualified as sufficiently narrow.126 
Justice Scalia’s dissent embraced the revisionist position and urged against an 
interpretation of section 1350 that would give federal courts the discretion to 
recognize causes of action for violations of modern customary international law.127 
No political branch has authorized courts to incorporate customary international 
law into federal common law, which is the sine-qua-non condition post-Erie.128 In 
reply, the majority, per Justice Souter, argued that the Court’s interpretation was 
supported by an original intent interpretation of what violations of the law of 
nations meant at the end of the eighteenth century and concluded, after looking 
back at two centuries of decisions incorporating international norms into the body 
of American law, that “[i]t would take some explaining to say now that federal 
courts must avert their gaze entirely from any international norm intended to 
protect individuals.”129 
Hardly anyone had reason to be surprised that the Court imposed a set of 
conditions as to the nature and status of norms of customary human rights that can 
be given legal effect in American law. Revisionist alarmism is unjustified. Or at 
least it was not justified by worries about the indeterminacy of customary 
international law as much as by attempts to defend a vision of the American 
constitutionalism. As Justice Scalia wrote: 
 
The notion that a law of nations, redefined to mean the consensus of 
states on any subject, can be used by a private citizen to control a 
sovereign’s treatment of its own citizens within its own territory is a 
20th-century invention of internationalist law professors and human 
rights advocates.130  
 
There is, however, a competing narrative. Writing in 1980, the Filartiga 
court—composed neither of international law professors nor human-rights 
activists—explained why the torturer had become the equivalent of the pirate and 
slave trader, a “hostis humani generis, an enemy of all mankind,”131 and reflected 
on its own decision in that case as “a small but important step in the fulfillment of 
the ageless dream to free all people from brutal violence.”132 This narrative, which 
was embraced by Justice Souter’s majority opinion in Sosa, counters the 
“revisionist” model on each of its claims. It argues that sovereignty is becoming 
                                                 
126 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 734. 
127 See id. at 739 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
128 Id. 
129 Id. at 729–30. 
130 Id. at 749–50 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
131 Filartiga v. Pena-Irata, 630 F.2d 876, 890 (2d Cir. 1980) (emphasis added). The 
court qualified that statement by saying that the analogy holds for the purpose of civil 
liability. Id.   
132 Id.  
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disintegrated133 and accordingly that the lack of a centralized decision-maker does 
not undermine the authority of customary international law.134 It also makes the 
argument that international law has been considered part of American law 
throughout history.135 Against authoritative jurisprudential accounts that denied 
international law the status of law,136 it shows that there are no differences between 
domestic and international legal regimes.137  
The point of contrasting these two narratives is to show that the debate about 
customary international law is less about the nature of those norms than about 
“notions that lie at the core of American legal self-understanding.”138 The 
purported dangers that revisionists mention are exaggerations with little support in 
reality. The more likely explanation of their position is that customary human-
rights norms seem to threaten both the hard theoretical core of American 
constitutionalism as well as the achievements of American constitutional law. The 
same is true about the foreign law debate. One is likely to resist claims about the 
relevance of customary human-rights norms, as well as the use of foreign law, if 
one starts from the strong premise that American constitutionalism should remain 
the only vehicle for recognition and enforcement of human rights in America.139 
Much of this comes down, as we shall see in Part IV, to an assessment of the 
record of domestic constitutionalism in protecting rights. Before we get to that part 
of the analysis, we need to consider the argument that foreign law has authority by 
virtue of being the modern ius gentium. 
 
D.  Foreign Law and the Law of Nations 
 
One attempt to escape the polarization of the foreign law debate has been 
advanced by Professor Jeremy Waldron.140 He argues, on largely pragmatic 
grounds, that the authority of foreign law in situations when there is an emerging 
legal consensus derives from it being the modern ius gentium (law of nations).141  
The premise of this argument is that law, like science, is a “problem-solving 
enterprise.”142 Framed in these terms, the self-understanding of legal actors is 
overshadowed by law’s function. This much is clear: a doctor’s metaphysical 
                                                 
133 See SLAUGHTER, supra note 5, at 152−62 Helen Stacy, Relational Sovereignty, 55 
STAN. L. REV. 2029, 2043 (2003). For an elaborate discussion of this phenomenon, see 
Dieter Grimm, The Constitution in the Process of Denationalization, 12 CONSTELLATIONS 
447, 331−45 (2005). 
134 This claim is made by Professors Bradley and Goldsmith. See Bradley & 
Goldsmith, supra note 103, at 331−45. 
135 See Koh, supra note 21. 
136 See HART, supra note 81, at 208. 
137 See Koh, supra note 21, at 2601. 
138 Aleinikoff, supra note 112, at 92. 
139 Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 103, at 368. 
140 See Waldron, supra note 8, at 146.  
141 Id.  
142 Id.  
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qualms matter little to the patient; what really matters is the cure. Foreign law 
appears as a valuable resource—a body of accumulated knowledge—that contains 
the answers that foreign legal systems have provided to common problems. 
Importantly, this body of knowledge contains only common answers. Professor 
Waldron’s theory is tailored specifically for cases like Roper where foreign 
solutions form “a dense and mutually reinforc[ing] consensus.”143 This body of 
accumulated knowledge constitutes the modern ius gentium and provides the only 
possible grounding for a theory of the citation of foreign law.  
The gist of this theory becomes clear once we ask how this model is supposed 
to have worked in Roper. American judges were confronted in that case with the 
problem whether to uphold the juvenile death penalty as constitutional.144 Given 
the doctrinal corpus of American constitutional law, they specifically had to 
determine whether that form of punishment qualified as cruel and unusual within 
the meaning of the Eighth Amendment.145 As it happens, there is already in the 
world a body of accumulated knowledge that comprises the answers of the world’s 
legal systems to the question whether adults should be executed for crimes they 
committed as minors. While foreign jurisdictions obviously did not address the 
specific question of the interpretation of the U.S. Constitution, the problem they 
addressed was indeed identical. Is this enough?  
When judges decide cases, they apply a body of legal materials to a fact 
pattern. Depending on a judge’s legal theory, that body of legal materials can be 
broad or narrow: for instance, it may include moral principles or it may not; it may 
include foreign law or it may not. Not every fact pattern automatically qualifies as 
a legal problem, just as not every natural phenomenon automatically qualifies as a 
scientific problem. Whether a fact pattern is perceived as a problem depends on 
what the legal materials say about it. It is not a problem whether in the United 
States women have the right to vote because anyone agrees that the legal materials 
applicable to any fact pattern raising that question include the text of the 
Constitution, which is clear on this point. Similarly, for an originalist like Justice 
Scalia, the constitutionality of the juvenile death penalty is not a legal problem. Its 
answer is as obvious as the answer to why cancerous cells cause death is to a 
doctor. This point is important because a judge is unlikely to look at ius gentium, 
or anywhere else, for guidance unless they believe that guidance is needed—
unless, that is, they believe the case before them qualifies as a legal problem. We 
see again the important connection between the questions with which a court is 
presented and the methodology it deploys in answering them. Hence the relevance 
of ius gentium as a body of law that contains answers to common problems is 
questionable.  
In Waldron’s view, ius gentium does not replace or trump domestic law: it 
only guides its elaboration and development in those cases where domestic law is 
                                                 
143 Id. at 145. 
144 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 555 (2005). 
145 Id. 
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open to a number of possible interpretations.146 Going back to our judge faced with 
a question about the constitutionality of the juvenile death penalty, it turns out that 
a quick survey of foreign legal systems shows the existence of a common solution 
to this problem. This solution urges against executing adults for crimes they 
committed when they were children. To be sure, the existence of a consensus is no 
guarantee of truth. No one looking for moral truth would need to survey the 
world’s legal systems. The existence of consensus on this matter is no more a 
guarantee of moral truth than is the lack of a consensus on same-sex marriages 
evidence that banning these marriages is morally permissible. Just like in science, 
the importance of a consensus is rather that it provides “an established body of 
legal insight, reminding [one] that [the] particular problem ha[d] been confronted 
before and that they . . . should . . . think it through in the company of those who 
have already dealt with it.”147 Common answers form an area of “overlap, 
duplication, mutual elaboration, and the checking and rechecking of results that is 
characteristic of true science.”148 Faced with the problem of the constitutionality of 
the juvenile death penalty, American courts would have as many reasons not to 
look at how that very problem has been addressed in other legal systems as would 
public health officials confronted with a new epidemic within their borders have 
for disregarding how that epidemic had been fought in other countries.149  
The legal status of this body of available knowledge does not apply as a rule 
of customary international law (although it is not impossible “that penal practices 
might come under international law scrutiny in the same sort of way”150). Its legal 
force is indirect and in a sense more powerful, since it purports to serve as a guide 
in interpreting the meaning of the Constitution, which is the supreme law of the 
land. Its interpretative authority rests on two grounds. We have already 
encountered the first one: it would be unwise not to benefit from the existence of a 
body of law in solving difficult problems at hand. Ius gentium could for instance 
help with the many difficulties regarding the administration of the death penalty. 
This assumes, of course, that the commonality was established so that challenges 
to the relevance of empirical data or comparative lessons about constitutional 
structures can be set aside. However, quite apart from the above remarks about 
what questions qualify as problems, the necessity of “translation” raises legitimate 
concerns. As Justice Scalia argued in Roper, the existence of juries as sentencing 
authorities in American law is an essential element in determining the 
constitutionality of the juvenile death penalty.151 This goes to show that “foreign 
authorities . . . do not even speak to the issue before [the Court].”152 Other authors 
have also warned of the dangers of nominalism in constitutional comparisons.153 
                                                 
146 See Waldron, supra note 8, at 139. 
147 Id. at 133.  
148 Id. at 138–39. 
149 Id. at 143. 
150 Id. at 139. 
151 See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 623–24 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
152 Id. at 624. 
153 See Tushnet, supra note 29, at 1307.  
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By failing to address the criteria for establishing “commonality,” Waldron eschews 
too many of these difficulties.  
The purported authority of ius gentium is grounded also in a second set of 
considerations. To identify them, we need to ask whether this authority is one 
based on reasons or numbers. Since Waldron’s model is meant to apply only to 
those situations where there is an emerging world consensus,154 its authority is at 
least partly based on what above we called “nose-counting.” It is emphatically not 
limited to that: “ius gentium is more than the sum of its parts, [it is] a dense and 
mutually reinforced consensus.”155 This consensus confers special weight to the 
authority of foreign law, one that sets it apart from under-theorized, purely 
instrumental grounds.156 At the same time, we know that the existence of world 
consensus is no guarantor of truth; Waldron remains, after all, a legal positivist. In 
fact, while the substantive, reason-based authority of ius gentium varies from topic 
to topic, its prima facie authority is that of “the accumulated wisdom of the world 
on rights and justice.”157 As history shows, ius gentium represents a more grounded 
focus of aspiration to justice, “looking not just to philosophic reason but to what 
law had actually achieved in the world.”158 It is in this sense that the authority of 
this additional body of law can be said to rest on both the fact of consensus and the 
reasons that support it.  
The ius gentium theory has two main limitations. First, it does not speak to the 
legitimacy of enlarging the interpretative canon by including references to ius 
gentium in the elaboration and development of domestic law. While it is true that 
this theory is not confined to constitutional interpretation, the fact that it refers 
specifically to the Court’s use of foreign law in Roper is sufficient to evaluate it by 
its constitutional implications. Waldron hopes to dispose of this problem by 
addressing an audience already convinced that law is the domain of reason rather 
than will. If law is a problem-solving rational activity, then no available body of 
knowledge ought to be ignored. That is what the law’s aim—its promise to 
justice—entails.159 Waldron’s theory implies the Constitution is law above all else, 
law even before it is “supreme law,” and hence a constitutional theory is 
necessarily parasitic upon a more general legal theory. If the use of ius gentium is 
                                                 
154 See Waldron, supra note 8, at 132. 
155 Id. at 145.  
156 This is what Justice Breyer’s defense of the use of foreign law on pragmatic 
grounds looks like at times. See Antonin Scalia & Stephen Breyer, The Relevance of 
Foreign Legal Materials in U.S. Constitutional Cases, 3 INT’L J. CONST. L. 519, 522 
(2005).  
157 Waldron, supra note 8, at 138. 
158 Id. at 134. 
159 Id. at 140 (“In addressing this problem, we need all the help we can get. If these 
issues have been wrestled with in a number of other jurisdictions, then our commitment to 
the pursuit of justice should lead us to examine the end product of their labors for 
guidance.”); see also Jeremy Waldron, Does Law Promise Justice?, 17 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 
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justified as part of law’s telos, then one should not be overly worried about 
constitutional legitimacy.  
This argument dovetails well with the assertion that ius gentium is the product 
of a reflective equilibrium between positive law and natural law.160 Positive law 
need not abandon its aspirational dimension. Like many recent legal theories, this 
one also emphasizes the complementary character of the two schools of 
jurisprudential thought. However, a question remains about the place of history in 
this model. It should not be overlooked that history colors our understanding of the 
reflective equilibrium between positivism and natural law. Professor Waldron’s 
views on this matter are nuanced. Unsurprisingly, he points out that “courts have 
invoked ius gentium [depending] in part on the purposes, traditions and categories 
of the particular court using it.”161 He also rejects Savigny’s essentializing local 
customs because, first, it would inadvertently foreclose what legal systems can 
learn from one another in “technical matters” such as the administration of the 
death penalty and, second, it would turn a blind eye to “the complex rights and 
wrongs” of the legal matter under consideration.162 All these points are well taken, 
but one remains with the feeling that history is still not given its proper due. By 
history  it is meant, the idea of law as an ongoing historical project.163 A sound 
jurisprudential project must integrate a moral dimension (from natural law theory), 
a political dimension (from legal positivism), and a historical dimension (in the 
historical school). As we learned from debates about customary international law 
and constitutional interpretation, questions about the legitimacy of using foreign 
law seem to always come down to the self-understanding of the American 
legal/constitutional identity. History plays a crucial role in understanding 
constitutional identity. Waldron’s emphasis on the problem-solving nature of law 
and science prevents him from giving history its due. Perhaps neglect of history is 
the price that Waldron’s conception pays for avoiding the polarized camps of the 
foreign law debate. 
A second limitation of the conception under consideration is its exclusive 
focus on situations where there is a world consensus. This is clearly not a 
contingent limit in Waldron’s theory. The very authority of ius gentium is 
predicated on the existence of an emerging consensus. What is more, Professor 
Waldron does not argue that ius gentium provides only one of the possible grounds 
on which foreign law can be cited. He argues adamantly that it is the only one: 
“[Piecemeal citation] . . . as though it were a casual matter of getting a little bit of 
help here and a little bit of help there,”164 of the type Justice Breyer’s pragmatism 
supports, “would be easy to discredit.”165  
                                                 
160 Waldron, supra note 8, at 136. For reflective equilibrium in moral philosophy, see 
JOHN RAWLS, THEORY OF JUSTICE 48–51 (1971). 
161 Waldron, supra note 8, at 136.  
162 Id. at 140. 
163 See generally Harold Berman, Toward an Integrative Jurisprudence: Politics, 
Morality, History, 76 CAL. L. REV. 779, 795 (1988).  
164 Waldron, supra note 8, at 144. 
165 Id. at 145. 
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Easy or not, it is unclear why that should not be the required explanandum of 
any theory of the citations of foreign law. If the Roper Court could look for 
guidance at foreign law, why cannot the Court do the same when faced—as it soon 
will be—with a challenge to the constitutionality of the ban on same-sex 
marriages? Why should it matter that there is no world consensus on same-sex 
marriages? Why would the Court (or courts in general) need less guidance in that 
case than it did when deciding on the constitutionality of the juvenile death 
penalty? One possible answer is that Professor Waldron, who is a noted opponent 
of judicial review,166 believes that the Court should have no role reviewing duly-
passed legislation that makes the institution of marriage unavailable to same-sex 
couples. The problem with this answer is that the ius gentium model is not directed 
exclusively to judges. Legislators—who were placed on the jurisprudential map 
almost single-handedly by Professor Waldron167—should equally take into 
consideration the law of nations (although it is unclear why they should be limited 
to situations of world consensus). Whatever advantages a model that limits the use 
of foreign law to a small core of instances of world consensus may have, they are 
far outweighed by its shortcomings. The lack of relevant differences between cases 
such as the juvenile death penalty and those of same-sex marriage, the right to die, 
affirmative action, or gender discrimination makes that point unequivocally. It is a 
merit of Waldron’s theory that it presents the authority of foreign law from the 
perspective of the decision-maker. Yet, from that perspective, it makes little sense 
to treat these two cases differently.168 Both in cases of world consensus as well as 
in those of “piecemeal comparisons,” courts need guidance, and should be able to 
make use of whatever resources there are. It would do injustice to the potential of 
comparative constitutionalism, and to the quality of work that we expect from our 
judges, to limit the use of foreign law to situations of world consensus. 
  
IV.  PIECEMEAL COMPARISONS 
 
Let us begin again with an example. It is only a matter of time before 
challenges to the constitutionality of the ban on same-sex marriages reach the 
Supreme Court. After the Court in Lawrence struck down as unconstitutional a 
Texas statute criminalizing homosexual sodomy,169 it will soon be asked to square 
that decision with the practice of banning same-sex marriages, especially since 
marriage has long been recognized as a fundamental interest that deserves 
                                                 
166 For the most recent statement of his views on this matter, see Jeremy Waldron, The 
Core of the Case Against Judicial Review, 115 YALE L.J. 1346 (2007). 
167 See generally JEREMY WALDRON, THE DIGNITY OF LEGISLATION (1999).  
168 The Chief Justice of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts has powerfully 
made this point. See Marshall, supra note 9, at 1642 (“How odd . . . when one stops to 
think of it: A novel issue of constitutional law will send us, our clerks, and counsel to the 
library to uncover any possible United States sources of authority—including the note of a 
second-year law student. But in our search for a useful legal framework, we ignore the 
opinion of a prominent constitutional jurist abroad that may be directly on point.”).  
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heightened protection.170 The aim here is not to offer predictions about the Court’s 
answer, but rather to ask whether the Justices should “look for guidance” at foreign 
sources in making their decision.  
A quick survey of the world’s legal systems shows that no consensus on this 
matter is in sight. While more and more jurisdictions are setting in place forms of 
unions for same-sex couples that resemble marriage in all but name, the 
contentious constitutional issue is whether a ban on same-sex marriage is at odds 
with principles of constitutional equality and liberty that all modern constitutions 
guarantee. So far, only a handful of countries have given same-sex couples access 
to marriage, either by legislative action (e.g., Spain and the Netherlands) or by 
judicial decisions (Canada) or by legislative action at the request of courts (South 
Africa). In the United States, only Massachusetts has so far struck down the ban as 
unconstitutional under state law.171   
Hence arguments for the authority of foreign law cannot rest on numbers, but 
neither can efforts to undermine it. If one looks at trends, as the Court did in 
Roper,172 then recent developments add up to sufficient evidence of an ongoing 
trend in an area where virtually no changes have occurred over time. It follows that 
reference to numbers by either side is inconclusive. Whatever authority foreign law 
might claim would have to rest on reasons. We now enter the area of what 
Professor Waldron called “piecemeal citation,” which is, he warned, “easy to 
discredit.”173  
It is not difficult to see why. The central concerns refer to a lack of 
methodology in how judges should use foreign sources. What jurisdictions they 
should consult, how to check sources and references, how to escape the dangers of 
nominalism, and how to assess the relevance of a particular provision or line of 
reasoning outside of its broader legal, cultural and historical context—these 
questions are significantly more difficult to answer in the case of “piecemeal 
comparisons” than a situation of world consensus. Yet unless an answer is 
provided there is a serious risk that judges will cite foreign sources in a selective 
and unprincipled way as part of their broader strategy to “sell” results based on 
personal preferences rather than on law.  
This argument is sufficiently powerful even without overstating it. Concerns 
about methodology are often used as arguments against judicial review. It is 
claimed that citing foreign law can dramatically expand judicial discretion since 
the accuracy and relevance of the citations cannot be reliably verified. Whether or 
not particular instances where foreign law is invoked would be wrong, 
inappropriate, or strategically motivated, the charge is that the effect would be the 
same: expansion of judicial discretion. This line of criticism assumes that a 
methodology has not been worked out, which at this point remains an open 
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question. Even so this worry seems exaggerated because it inadvertently amplifies 
the authority of one method of constitutional interpretation over all others. As one 
commentator notes: 
 
[C]onstitutional interpretation in our common law tradition already 
involves considerations of multiple interpretative sources, including text, 
intent, precedent, history, structure, values, and pragmatic consequences. 
When domestic interpretative resources align, foreign or international 
law will not move U.S. judges toward a different result.174  
 
Its outward-reaching dimension would indeed set foreign law apart from other 
sources. However, placing it alongside other interpretative tools shows that it is 
unfair to cry “judicial discretion” when virtually all other methods have been, and 
still are, deeply contested. It is for this reason that concerns about methodology in 
using foreign law should be kept separate from concerns about judicial 
discretion.175 
Methodological concerns in this area can only be answered by defending a 
substantive normative vision of constitutionalism whose by-product will be a 
defensible methodology for using foreign law. In what follows, the Article makes 
the case for the connection between method and substance by discussing three 
different theses that challenge its authority. According to the first thesis, expanding 
the canon of interpretative materials to include foreign law would undermine core 
assumptions about the democratic self-government of the American people.176 The 
second thesis argues that using foreign law is a form of constitutional borrowing 
that may alter the normative makeup of the American constitutional system.177 The 
third thesis voices the worry that a widespread use of foreign law in constitutional 
adjudication will undermine the integrity of the American constitutional 
discourse.178  
 
A.  The Argument from Self-Government 
 
This argument claims that including foreign constitutional practices in the 
canon of authoritative interpretative materials violates basic democratic principles 
of self-government. It is a condition of freedom to be subject only to such laws as 
one would impose upon oneself, either directly or through representatives.179 It 
would therefore take some work to show on what grounds the laws of other nations 
                                                 
174 Jackson, supra note 34, at 122 (footnote omitted).  
175 Neuman, supra note 22, at 90 (“[I]nterpretative aids may increase the resources 
available to judicial discretion, but prohibiting their use would hardly have prevented 
judicial activism, of either the liberal or the conservative variety.”). 
176 See infra Part IV.A. 
177 See infra Part IV.B. 
178 See infra Part IV.C. 
179 See generally JÜRGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS 
TO A DISCOURSE THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY (William Rehg trans., 1998).  
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can claim authority over American citizens. One can easily see why such efforts 
might be destined to fail. The reason is not necessarily the impossibility of  
working out a conception of such grounds, as in some version of cosmopolitanism, 
but rather that it would be very difficult to demonstrate that those grounds are the 
same as those on which American law has built its claim to legitimacy over the 
course of its history. The claim is that American conception of democratic self-
government simply does not allow for the use of foreign law for purposes of 
constitutional interpretation.  
To start, this claim has to be restated as one about American democracy. After 
all, European states are also democracies, whose citizens are presumably no less 
self-governed than Americans, and nevertheless do not seem worried about using 
non-European legal sources in interpreting their founding documents. The same is 
true about India, Israel, South Africa, Canada, and many other systems. An 
explanation is needed as to what, if anything, sets American democracy apart. This 
explanation is particularly important considering that the argument from self-
government is often invoked as self-evident. The aim in this Part is to question 
whether there is anything self-evident about it. In fact, when analyzed closely, the 
American conception of self-government is, in fact, the object of deep 
interpretative disagreements. Since any given interpretation has to prove its 
historical and normative soundness, it follows that dismissing the authority of 
foreign law requires more than a mere declaration of incompatibility with a 
purportedly “self-evident” conception of self-government.180  
Professor Jed Rubenfeld recently advanced a comparative formulation of the 
argument from self-government.181 His claim is that American and European 
conceptions of constitutionalism are fundamentally different. The American 
conception, which he terms “democratic constitutionalism,” sees “constitutional 
law as embodying a particular nation’s fundamental, democratically self-given”—
through national democratic processes—“legal and political commitments.”182 The 
emphasis here is on the Constitution as “the product of a national participatory 
political process, through which people commit to writing the fundamental values 
or principles that will govern their society.”183 The invention of eighteenth-century 
America was not constitutional democracy, but rather democratic 
constitutionalism.184 By contrast, in Europe, democracy comes before 
constitutionalism.185 The latter is understood as a series of checks and constraints 
on democracy.186 In the European conception, it is less important that the 
constitution be “the product of a national participatory political process . . . [than 
                                                 
180 Compare Alford, supra note 37, at 709–12 (claiming that comparativism is 
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that it] recognize human rights, protect minorities, establish the rule of law, and set 
up stable democratic political institutions.”187 By American standards, 
“international constitutionalism” is deeply antidemocratic. The roots of this 
difference, Professor Rubenfeld argues, are to be found in history, more 
specifically in the radically different lessons of the Second World War.188 For 
Europeans, the war exemplified the horrors of nationalism, democracy, and 
popular sovereignty that brought tyrants like Hitler and Mussolini into power.189 
By contrast, victory taught Americans to cherish their particular form of 
nationalism and democracy.190 These lessons shaped subsequent attitudes toward 
international law. Europeans saw it as a check on national sovereignty; for 
Americans, by contrast, it was a tool to Americanize the world by promoting a 
“constitutionalism in which fundamental rights as well as protections of minorities 
would be laid down as part of the world’s basic law, ostensibly beyond the reach of 
ordinary political processes.”191 The success of the latter project contained the 
seeds of its own destruction: the more successful international constitutionalism 
became, the stronger its claims on the United States; the less responsive the United 
States grew to these claims, the more the international community was using 
international law to contain U.S. power. On this basis, Rubenfeld concludes that 
claims to authority made by international law are undemocratic by American 
standards and thus fated never to succeed.192 
It is unsurprising that from the perspective of “democratic constitutionalism” 
international legal norms and foreign constitutional laws are treated similarly. If 
anything, the approach to international legal norms applies even more powerfully 
to claims about the relevance of foreign law. Even if incorporated into American 
law, international legal rules would still have a lower status than the Constitution. 
Notwithstanding, recognizing foreign law as a method of interpretation would 
impact directly on the Constitution itself, the supreme law of the land.  
Consider, for instance, the exchange between the majority and dissenting 
Justices in Roper regarding the invocation of the Convention of the Rights of the 
Child.193 Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy mentioned article 37 of the 
convention, which bans the juvenile death penalty.194 Since the United States was 
not a signatory to the convention, Justice Kennedy’s point was by necessity purely 
interpretative. In fact, he specified that only the United States and Somalia have 
not ratified the convention, as further evidence of an emerging world consensus on 
the matter before the court.195 Justice Scalia did not let that pass unnoticed, 
scolding the majority for its disregard of basic principles of self-government. In 
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interpreting the U.S. Constitution, the majority invoked a convention that the 
American people, through their representatives, have refused to ratify.196 This is a 
violation of the principle of self-government, which is the core of the American 
conception of “democratic constitutionalism.”197  
Yet Justice Kennedy’s position does not rest on as frail a foundation as its 
opponents suggest, and this has important implications for gauging the strength of 
the argument from self-government. Scholars have argued that American 
constitutionalism is every bit as internationalist as European constitutionalism. 
This is both a normative and historical thesis about the fading distinction between 
international and foreign law, on the one hand, and domestic law, on the other. In 
this view, the disintegration of sovereignty has elements no less pronounced in the 
United States than in other parts of the world.198 The old top-down order is now 
being replaced by a myriad of horizontal networks established among institutional 
actors (legislators, regulators, and judges). The allegiances of individuals tracks 
this development, since in the post-sovereign era “individuals owe loyalty not only 
to the governments that rule their geographical area, but have many other 
allegiances—corporatist, nongovernmental and community—that crosshatch with 
national borders.”199 The normative argument follows the historical one. The crisis 
of legal positivism after the Second World War opened the way for an expansion 
of the domain of normativity, that has become the peculiarity of contemporary 
legal thought both domestically200 and internationally.201 Fundamental rights, 
enshrined in both national bills of rights and international human rights documents, 
have a suprapositive dimension, meaning that they are “conceived as reflections of 
nonlegal principles that have normative force independent of their embodiment in 
law, or even superior to the positive legal system.”202 
The internationalist and the traditionalist (or “domestic constitutionalist”) 
positions have different implications as far as the use of foreign law is concerned. 
From a domestic constitutionalism perspective, it could be claimed either that (1) 
American law could—but should not—revisit its democratic commitments in order 
to accommodate foreign/international insights (Justice Scalia203), or that (2) the 
                                                 
196 See id. at 613 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
197 See id. at 623–24, 628. 
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American conception of self-government could and maybe even should undergo a 
process of change, considering that democracy may not be the only value worth 
upholding (Professor Rubenfeld204), or, finally, that (3) the American conception of 
self-government is first and foremost a cultural conception that cannot be changed 
deliberately (Professor Paul Kahn205). From the internationalist perspective, the 
answer to the relevance of foreign law for constitutional interpretation could not be 
more obvious. “What sense does it make,” one prominent internationalist asks, “to 
construe evolving, universally recognized constitutional concepts such as ‘due 
process’ and privacy solely in light of national historical tradition?”206 
Neither position is supported by sufficient empirical evidence to warrant 
strong (self-evident) claims about the American conception of self-government. In 
each case, additional normative considerations provide the needed support for a 
specific interpretation of the demands of self-government. Neither purportedly 
self-evident historical explanations nor purportedly self-evident arguments about 
the impact of globalization are sufficient. The wall between international and 
domestic realms has not yet collapsed, although major cracks are indeed visible. 
The internationalists’ argument about the crumbling wall requires more than 
pointing continuously to the cracks. After all, the traditionalists argue that such 
cracks, whose existence they acknowledge, ought to be fixed. An answer is needed 
to the question of “why tear down the wall,” just as an answer would be needed 
about why to not let the wall collapse. These answers need to rest on a conception 
of American constitutional identity, which is prior to and informs the American 
conception of self-government. What is the place of foreign law in shaping the 
American constitutional identity? This is the central question, which cannot be 
answered merely by invoking the argument from self-government.  
 
B.  The Argument from Normative Constitutional Coherence 
 
This second thesis sees the use of foreign law as a form of constitutional 
borrowing and urges caution on the ground that it may impact on the normative 
cohesion of the American, or of any other advanced, constitutional system. From 
this perspective, the relevance of foreign law is neither wholesale rejected nor 
wholesale embraced. Its use can have both advantages and dangers. The advantage 
is that it may enrich the receiving legal system. The danger is that, in case of a 
misfit, it might destabilize the receiving legal system, especially if incompatibility 
                                                                                                                            
many possible positions—in fact, Justice Holmes believed something along those lines—it 
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is discovered late, after the damage has been inflicted. A helpful analogy, organic 
overtones aside, is that of a tissue transplant that the receiving body might reject 
but only after if it has already shattered its internal equilibrium. But how exactly 
can “bad borrowing” destabilize the internal equilibrium of the receiving 
constitutional system? What could be the possible damage?  
Professor Mary Ann Glendon has suggested one possible answer to this 
question in her analysis of Canadian abortion law.207 She pointed out that: 
 
A difficulty with borrowing bits and pieces of American 
constitutional law . . . is that these segments may encode certain views 
about law, the nature of man, and the position of the individual in society 
that may be at odds with those of the Canadian Charter, the Canadian 
people, and even of the Canadian judge who occasionally seeks 
illumination from American precedent.208 
 
She continues: “[i]t is a nice question to what extent one can selectively adopt 
elements of the United States Supreme Court decisions without inadvertently 
succumbing to the world-view they carry within them.”209 The assumption is that 
American and Canadian constitutional/legal systems embody a certain worldview, 
which is, we must assume, largely coherent. It is common in comparative studies 
to portray constitutional systems monochromatically. Seen from afar, details are 
harder to spot. The German system is said to embody communitarian values;210 the 
American political and constitutional system is often described as individualistic. 
At first glance, such assertions seem unproblematic. As Professor Glendon 
pointed out, regulation of abortion under the Roe v. Wade211 regime was 
remarkably liberal by world standards.212 She saw it as an expression of 
individualism, another instance of the damage that an emphasis on individual 
rights at the expense of community values has inflicted on the American public 
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moral stand.  
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discourse.213 Other areas of law also fit the individualistic mold. Speech, for 
instance, is protected in the United States to an extent unfathomable in other 
jurisdictions.214 The lack of constitutional protection for economic and social 
interests is another case in point.215 However, the emphasis on individualism is 
meant as more than just a common theme that underlines different areas of 
doctrine. Its aim is to show that constitutional doctrine, and law in general, is an 
expression of deep cultural identity. Legal rules do not come from nowhere: they 
find their origin in views about the nature of man and society, as they crystallize 
over time in given cultures. The American and, say, Canadian or German legal 
cultures have crystallized differently. In constitutional borrowing there is a risk of 
glossing over these differences. However, none of this is meant as a strong thesis 
against borrowing. Glendon rejects take-it-or-leave-it approaches to foreign law, 
which are all too common in the debate between traditionalists and 
internationalists.216 Neither legal xenophobia nor legal xenophilia is acceptable.217 
By placing law within a broader universe of values, this thesis urges nothing more 
than honesty and caution in the use of foreign sources. The soundness of this 
argument is questionably untenable, on a strong reading, or trite, on a weak 
reading.  
Let us start by observing that in a weak reading Glendon’s concerns can be 
easily addressed. Critical judgment need not be suspended when using foreign 
sources. To argue that foreign law can be used in constitutional interpretation says 
nothing about the authority of any given line of reasoning. As we have seen, even 
under a persuasive authority model in a situation of emerging world consensus, 
courts can reason their way out of that consensus. One would therefore expect 
“negative comparisons” to be possible in the absence of such a consensus. In fact, 
evidence indicates that oftentimes judges define their positions by contrast with 
those adopted by their foreign peers.218 Using foreign jurisdictions as negative 
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examples is an important step in the development of constitutional systems. For 
instance, the American agonizing experience with substantive due process has 
loomed large in the minds of constitution-makers from Canada219 to India220 as 
well as in those of constitutional interpreters.221 
However, at a deeper level, Glendon operates with an indefensible conception 
of the nature of constitutional systems.222 Portraying such systems as monoliths of 
either the individualistic or communitarian variety is both static and reductionist. It 
is static because it fails to account for exchanges whose outcomes create a 
constitutional system. It is a strikingly narrow conception that defines law only in 
terms of the judicial decision settling a given legal controversy and brackets away 
the arguments that each side argued before the court, the different interpretations 
they relied on, and the visions of man, society, and law in which they were 
steeped. For the claimant asking a court to strike down a law that cuts back on his 
social benefits, the legal system is not “individualistic,” just as the litigant asking 
for the protection of his speech regardless of the serious emotional harm it causes 
to others does not experience the legal system as “communitarian.” To describe it 
in these terms marks a significant, and in my view unfortunate, departure from 
how its immediate subjects experience the legal system as well as an unwarranted 
simplification of the path by which judicial decisions, and legal rules in general, 
come into existence.  
Glendon’s approach is also reductionist because it conflates one dimension of 
any constitutional system at the expense of all others. Of course mature systems 
contain both liberal and communitarian elements; they would not reach maturity 
and gain whatever legitimacy they might have if they did not. The degree of 
normative responsiveness to citizens’ demands is one criterion for assessing the 
legitimacy of a constitutional system. In a pluralist society, these demands are 
conflicting and in continuous fluctuation, thereby making it an imperative that the 
legal system ought not ossify. Notwithstanding widespread conceptual analysis in 
                                                                                                                            
Constitutionalism: The Case for Studying Cross-Constitutional Influence Through 
Negative Models, 1 INT’L J. CONST. L. 296, 296–324 (2003), and Heinz Klug, Model and 
Anti-Model: The United States Constitution and the “Rise of World Constitutionalism,” 
2000 WIS. L. REV. 597 (2000). 
219 Sujit Choudhry, The Lochner Era and Comparative Constitutionalism, 2 INT’L J. 
CONST. L. 1, 1–55 (2004). 
220 See Klug, supra note 218, at 605–06 (discussing the exchanges between Justice 
Frankfurter and Sir B.N. Rau on the topic of substantive due process).  
221 Glendon, supra note 207, at 577 (“[I]t does not seem an exaggeration to say that 
the shadow of the United States Supreme Court’s long history of struggle with substantive 
due process review of legislation is omnipresent, brooding over nearly every paragraph of 
[Chief Justice Dickson’s] reasons for judgment [in R. v. Morgentaler].” (citing R. v. 
Morgentaler, [1988] S.C.R. 30 (Can.))).  
222 Of course, Professor Glendon’s is not the only conception that assesses the impact 
of foreign law on the coherence of the domestic constitution system. Justice Scalia’s 
position toward the use of foreign law in constitutional adjudication also fits under this 
heading. For an analysis along these lines, see Sarah K. Harding, Comparative Reasoning 
and Judicial Review, 28 YALE J. INT’L L. 409, 441–43 (2003).  
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legal thought, one should not forget that they are social constructions.223 But the 
crux of the matter is that any advanced legal system presents itself as an unstable 
equilibrium of a number of such conflicting visions. This instability, which is 
identifiable in any almost area of doctrine, has two sources: (1) the existence of a 
plurality of visions; and (2) the tendency of any powerful vision to undermine 
itself.224 A constitutional system has the potential to develop in any number of 
directions. Few of these directions are “unnatural,” only those violating clear 
constitutional provisions that do not choose the path of constitutional amendment, 
though some of them may of course be highly undesirable. Hence the argument 
from normative coherence fails to support a strong case against the authority of 
foreign law. We now need to make the transition from normative challenges to the 
use of foreign law to challenges that are mainly methodological. As we shall see in 
the next section, this is an easy transition because the two types of arguments 
mutually reinforce each other. 
 
C.  The Argument from Methodology 
 
As we saw in Part I, fears about the potential impact of a lack of methodology 
explain the shift in the second stage of the foreign law debate toward defending the 
use of foreign law only in situations where there is an emerging world consensus. 
The intuition is that methodological questions—such as which jurisdictions judges 
should consult, how to check sources and references, how they can escape the 
dangers of nominalism, and how to assess the relevance of a particular provision or 
line of reasoning outside of its broader legal, cultural, and historical context—are 
more difficult to answer in situations of piecemeal comparisons, with serious 
implications about the integrity of constitutional discourse.225 Hence 
methodological challenges may be fatal to claims regarding the authority of 
foreign law in such situations. Before assessing their impact, let us start by 
analyzing their content.  
We begin by distinguishing two sets of methodological concerns. One set of 
concerns looks at methodology from the perspective of the mechanics of 
constitutional adjudication. The other set refers to the implications for the integrity 
of constitutional discourse.  
Including foreign law in the canon of authoritative materials would have 
momentous implications for the mechanics of constitutional adjudication.226 
                                                 
223 See generally Frederick Schauer, The Social Construction of the Concept of Law: 
A Reply to Julie Dickson, 25 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 493 (2005).  
224 See generally ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, WHAT SHOULD LEGAL ANALYSIS 
BECOME? (1996) (advocating a radical transformation of legal analysis)  
225 “Less pronounced” is not tantamount to “nonexistent.” See supra text 
accompanying note 198. 
226 See Stephen Breyer, Keynote Address, 97 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 265, 267 
(2003) (“Neither I nor my law clerks can easily find relevant comparative material on our 
own. The lawyers must do the basic work: finding, analyzing, and referring us to that 
material. There is a chicken-and-egg problem: the lawyers will do so only if they believe 
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Having to engage with the reasoning of foreign courts is almost certain to trigger a 
chain reaction throughout the legal system: briefs would mention them, lawyers 
appearing before courts would have to be prepared to answer questions about 
them, lower courts would follow suit, and so on. This development would 
represent “a distinct break in American constitutional-legal practice.”227  
Three lines of argument open at this point. The first is sociological: whatever 
great advantages expanding the canon of authoritative materials might have in an 
ideal situation, the legal profession is uniquely unqualified for this task. This is not 
an argument about the expansion of the canon of authoritative materials;228 it refers 
specifically to the sorry state of a legal profession unprepared to engage 
meaningfully with foreign materials.229 Law schools do not require their students 
to become literate in foreign law, and this situation is mirrored at the level of the 
judiciary. This argument is sufficiently strong even without exaggerating it. A 
cursory look at a typical law school curriculum suffices to demonstrate the 
resources of American law in adapting to new vocabularies. Experience suggests 
that if the legal market indicates demand for foreign law, the legal profession will 
supply it. Yet a worry remains about overburdening ill-equipped jurists with the 
task of engaging meaningfully with foreign resources. It follows that just as we 
might not trust our judges’ ability to arrive at morally right answers in hard cases 
so here we are cautioned against expanding the canon of authoritative materials by 
including foreign sources.230  
The second line of argument is normative and points to the achievements of 
the current system of constitutional adjudication. The assumption is that these 
achievements would be jeopardized if the constitutional structure were to open up 
to foreign influences. In its procedural version, this is an argument that 
constitutional discourse meets expectations by projecting interests and struggles 
over worldviews within a stable framework in which defeat is only temporary and 
second chances always exist. The constitutional system is said to have reached 
over time the proper equilibrium that settle these expectations. The normative 
version of this argument goes a step further and argues, in one version, that the 
system in its current form has the capacity to get a high percentage of cases 
morally right or, in a weaker form, that the current constitutional arrangement 
                                                                                                                            
the courts are receptive. By now, however, it should be clear that the chicken has broken 
out of the egg. The demand is there. To supply that demand, the law professors, who teach 
the law students, who will become the lawyers, who will brief the courts, must help to 
break down barriers between disciplines . . . .”). 
227 Frank Michelman, Integrity-Anxiety?, in AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM AND 
HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 35, at 241, 263.  
228 See generally Fried, supra note 26, at 811−13 (discussing constraints on 
authoritative materials available to judges as compared with materials available for 
scholarly articles). 
229 See Ackerman, supra note 29, at 774.  
230 See Frederick Schauer, Constitutional Positivism, 25 CONN. L. REV. 797, 797 
(1993) (distinguishing between morally right answers and legally right answers). 
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meets the requirements of legitimacy, though not of justice.231 It follows that there 
is no reason to open it to foreign law sources or modify it in any other way.  
The third—functionalist—argument grows out of the second but does not 
share its normative presuppositions. The claim here is that expanding the canon 
might make it impossible for the constitutional system to perform its functions. To 
the extent these functions are seen as valuable, this position shares significant 
ground with the second, normative argument in its proceduralist or weak 
substantive versions. So, what could this function be?  
Professor Frank Michelman of Harvard argued recently that the function is the 
very survival of the American polity.232 This is, importantly, an argument about the 
function of constitutional discourse and not about the system as such: it refers to 
perceptions, not to the reality behind it. Its starting point is the pervasiveness of 
moral disagreement in contemporary American society. Americans disagree, 
genuinely and deeply, over virtually every question of public life, from abortion to 
hate speech to welfare benefits to balancing security and liberty in times of war. 
Their disagreement about rights reflects deeper disagreements about justice. In 
fact, this argument goes, disagreement is so deep that it could, if left unchecked, 
endanger the very stability of American society. The political function of 
constitutional law is to provide a common ground, a form of discourse in which all 
self-governing citizens can engage. “In order to maintain a public discourse on 
governmental performance regarding people’s rights, Americans apparently need 
some point of normative reference more publicly objective than it feels as though 
morality can be for us. Enter constitutional law.”233  
However, constitutional law may prove unable to carry such a heavy burden. 
Its predicament should be understood against the backdrop of the impact of 
modernity on traditional models of structuring constitutional meaning.234 As one 
scholar writes, “if there is a common theme in the history of thought and of 
politics, it consists precisely in failure to sustain claims of unconditional authority 
on behalf of particular ways of talking, thinking, living, and organizing society.”235 
The fear is that unless its repertoire is somehow replenished, constitutional thought 
will reach a breakdown point. The consequences of that evolution would be 
momentous. In a society accustomed to “the privileges of the individual 
                                                 
231 See generally JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1996). 
232 See Michelman, supra note 227, at 241–76.  
233 Id. at 267−68.  
234 See Morton J. Horwitz, The Supreme Court, 1992 Term—Forward: The 
Constitution of Change: Legal Fundamentality Without Fundamentalism, 107 HARV. L. 
REV. 32, 34 (1994) (“Because it grew out of traditional conceptions of fundamentality that 
were rooted in religious structures of meaning, constitutional law has always tended toward 
incorporating a pre-modern vision of timeless and unchanging truths—toward, in a word, 
equating legal fundamentality with legal fundamentalism. . . . Thus arises the question . . . : 
how can the idea of fundamentality be rescued from its historic association with 
fundamentalism?” (footnote omitted)).  
235 ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, FALSE NECESSITY 576 (1987). 
210 UTAH LAW REVIEW [No. 1 
  
conscience,”236unbridled disagreement could shatter not only what Rawls called 
“stability for the right reasons”237 but social order itself. The use of foreign law 
may be the trigger of this process of destabilization. 
It should be remembered that this argument remains one about the 
implications of a lack of methodology. The problem is that, so framed, it is 
difficult to see what methodology could ever quiet such fears. If the cost of using 
foreign law may be the breakdown of social order, then no benefits could ever 
outweigh it, regardless of how persuasive the available methodology might be. The 
risk would simply not be worth taking. However, this is not Professor 
Michelman’s conclusion.238 He documents the phenomenon, but does not endorse 
it. In fact, he believes the anxiety over the future of constitutional discourse is 
exaggerated and that joining the transnational constitutional conversation might in 
fact replenish the resources of American constitutional discourse rather than 
undermine them.239 
The lesson, then, reaches deeper. Including foreign law in the canon of 
interpretation would indeed send a shockwave that would be felt across the 
constitutional system from the mechanics of adjudication to the structure of 
discourse and the content of particular constitutional doctrines. There is no point in 
denying this effect, and no reason to be apologetic about it. It is fair to oppose it on 
the ground that constitutional discourse in its current form delivers on its promise 
to an acceptable extent, and hence there is no reason to take risks. Michelman does 
not, others do. How are we to adjudicate this controversy? 
The success of a theory of comparative constitutionalism under the terms of 
the current debate often seems to come down to an assessment of how 
satisfactorily the constitutional system performs its tasks.240 But now it seems that 
we are reaching even deeper layers insofar as it is impossible to answer the above 
question without having some understanding of what those tasks may be. It is at 
this point that a functionalist model that relies on perceptions runs out of steam. 
The duty of a constitutional democratic system cannot only be to secure social 
order; it is, as we saw, to achieve “stability for the right reasons.”241 This change in 
emphasis forces an assessment of how the current constitutional structure, broadly 
understood, approximates “stability for the right reasons.” If it comes close to it, 
then the sociological objection we introduced above, which anchored opposition to 
                                                 
236 I borrow this formulation from Jeremy Waldron, The Primacy of Justice, 9 LEGAL 
THEORY 269 (2003).  
237 See RAWLS, supra note 231, at xlii.  
238 At this point, some go even further and portray the impact of foreign law on 
American constitutional discourses as a danger to the sovereignty of American law. See, 
e.g., Young, supra note 28, at 542 (“[S]overeignty in American law is intimately bound up 
with the basically procedural nature of our constitutional commitments.”).  
239 See Michelman, supra note 227, at 276. 
240 See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 103, at 368 (“Domestic constitutionalism 
has been the primary vehicle for recognition and enforcement of human rights in this 
country.”).  
241 See supra note 237 and accompanying text. 
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foreign law in considerations about the state of the legal profession, is likely to 
prevail.242 If, by contrast, the system does so poor a job that one finds it hard to 
remain committed to it, a defense of the use of foreign law is likely to become 
considerably stronger. My point is that because analysis entails evaluation, a 
defense of the use of foreign law has to be mounted from an internal point of view. 
The pressure exerted by the constitutional discourse has structured the foreign law 
debate in ways that preclude such an internal-point-of-view analysis.  
Sociological statements about the how the legal system performs its functions 
cannot capture the difference between stability, on the one hand, and “stability for 
the right reasons,” on the other, whatever those “right reasons” might be. This 
point also answers the worry that judges lack a methodology in using foreign law. 
However sound these worries may be, they are not enough to undermine the 
authority of foreign law. One can still aim at defining the tasks of domestic 
constitutional law in a way that mandates, or permits, the use of foreign law. 
Methodological worries, just like the critique that emphasizes self-government or 
normative constitutional coherence, are challenges to be met, rather than 
insuperable trammels that foredoom the claim to authority of foreign law. 
Hopefully, these arguments are sufficient to demonstrate the deep connection 
between methodological challenges to the use of foreign law and substantive 
visions of constitutional law. It follows from these conclusions that it is both 
possible and necessary to defend the use of foreign constitutional practices by 
articulating substantive visions of constitutional law that make the use of foreign 
law an integral part of their normative jurisprudential outlook.  
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
 
This Article has discussed the use of foreign law for purposes of 
constitutional interpretation as part of the process of awakening of the American 
legal mind to the reality of a larger constitutional world. To this encounter, 
American constitutional thought comes rather ill-prepared. This is not only a 
conclusion about the limited potential of the foreign law debate, but also a more 
general statement about the contemporary American constitutional discourse. 
Regardless whether or not the canon of constitutional interpretation should be 
extended to include foreign sources, it is striking how unwelcoming the terms of 
the foreign law debate are for engaging with the issues that an encounter of this 
magnitude raises.  
In order to understand the causes of this predicament, we analyzed a number 
of recurrent themes in American constitutional discourse. At the heart of the 
                                                 
242 The normative argument could equally well come across as convincing. See, e.g., 
Young, supra note 28, at 543 (“One fear entailed by sovereignty concerns is that delegation 
of lawmaking and law enforcement authority to supranational structures may interfere with 
domestic arrangements that, in our country at least, seem to be functioning relatively well. 
. . . [O]ne does not lightly throw [for instance, the habeas corpus] structure out the window 
in favor of a largely untested international procedure with unpredictable effects.”). 
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argument against the use of foreign law are a set of assumptions about the relation 
between the role of methodology in constitutional adjudication, the integrity of 
constitutional discourse, and the normative commitments of constitutional law. We 
pierced the veil of plausibility that methodological worries seem to enjoy by 
showing how they rest on interpretations of the normative commitments of 
American constitutionalism whose truth-value is not self-evident. The encounter 
with foreign law constitutes an opportunity to reflect anew on these normative 
commitments. Thus far this opportunity has not materialized, but time has not yet 
run out. This Article has argued that these debates should be first undertaken at a 
normative level where different visions of constitutional law clash, rather than be 
carried out in purely methodological terms. Failure to do so will result in a missed 
opportunity.243  
Consider, for instance, the array of constitutional systems that are used in 
cross-constitutional comparisons. This array is currently limited to a small number 
of jurisdictions that include Canada, South Africa, Germany, and sometimes 
Israel.244 A strong argument can be made that such limitations endanger the 
process of constitutional self-discovery, which is the outcome of broadening one’s 
constitutional horizons.245 Part of the potential of comparative constitutionalism is 
its promise to expand the range of constitutional comparisons by unveiling 
normative affinities among constitutional experiences that so far have not entered 
into dialogue with one another.246 To paraphrase one of Justice Black’s remarks, 
                                                 
243 Not all scholars subscribe to this view of the opportunity occasioned by the 
encounter with foreign law. For a less enthusiastic view, see generally RAN HIRSCHL, 
TOWARD JURISTOCRACY: THE ORIGIN AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE NEW 
CONSTITUTIONALISM (2004). I discuss this further in another publication. See Vlad Perju, 
Towards Juristocracy, 68 MOD. L. REV. 1038, 1038–41 (2005) (book review). 
244 For a conception that defends the use of foreign law as persuasive authority only 
by reference to a small number of jurisdictions, see Glensy, supra note Error! Bookmark 
not defined., at 359 (defending the limitation of cross-constitutional comparisons to a 
small number of jurisdictions). 
245 For a discussion of these dangers in the broader context of comparative law, see 
Gunter Frankenberg, Critical Comparisons: Re-thinking Comparative Law, 26 HARV. 
INT’L L.J. 411, 411 (1985). 
246 The same point is made by Harold Koh. Koh, Globalization of Freedom, supra 
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world’s most dynamic centers of legal change, for example, Indonesia; Nigeria; China; 
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there is no principled reason why cross-constitutional comparisons should be 
confined to a small core of jurisdictions.247  
This may be true unless, of course, one fears the consequences of not having a 
workable methodology when looking across borders. This Article has questioned 
the soundness of this point. Instead of making the methodological challenge the 
end of the debate about the authority of foreign law, we should see it as its starting 
point. Rather than working out a theory of comparative constitutionalism around 
these methodological objections, as has happened with the—largely failed—
attempts to confine the authority of foreign law only to those situations where there 
the solutions of world’s legal systems converge, we should confront these 
objections head-on. Here as elsewhere, method should track substantive visions, 
not vice-versa.  
There are strong reasons why reference to foreign laws and legal practices 
should be used in constitutional interpretation. Among the most powerful, in my 
view, is that they expand the normative universe of constitutional decision-
makers.248 Constitutional law, like political philosophy, is largely concerned with 
the interpretation of the meaning and implications of commitment to values such as 
equality, liberty, dignity, life, etc. Most of the time, these values are recognized by 
constitutional text.249 Comparative constitutionalism is a repertoire of frameworks 
within which various dimensions of these values are available for exploration.250 
No one constitutional context can claim monopoly over their meaning. In this 
light, cross-constitutional explorations are justified on the ground that different 
systems have developed particular vocabularies and structures that may shed light 
on dimensions of justice that are obscured in other constitutional contexts. Such an 
argument rests on a number of assumptions about the nature of constitutional 
systems and the role of constitutional adjudication that have been elaborated 
above.  
Whether along this or any other paths, the conclusion remains that we would 
do well to depart from the terms of the current foreign law debate and look around 
for fresh sources of inspiration. The awakening of American law to the larger legal 
world constitutes a unique opportunity to turn inward and look critically at the 
dominant form of constitutional discourse. A prerequisite for success is to step 
                                                 
247 The remark paraphrased is: “why should we consider only the notions of English-
speaking peoples to determine what are immutable and fundamental principles of justice.” 
Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 176 (1952) (Black, J., concurring). 
248 Aharon Barak, Forward: A Judge on Judging: The Role of a Supreme Court in a 
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or property, without due process of law . . . .”); id. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall . . . 
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person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”). 
250 For an approach to comparative constitutionalism along these lines, see Upendra 
Baxi, “A Known but an Indifferent Judge”: Situating Ronald Dworkin in Contemporary 
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outside that discourse and gain some degree of normative independence from its 
gravitational force. Once outside and looking around, we might like what we see, 
or we might not. But look we should, as this opportunity is one we cannot afford to 
miss.  
 
